The Unwritten Administrative Constitution by Bremer, Emily S.
Florida Law Review
Volume 66 | Issue 3 Article 6
February 2015
The Unwritten Administrative Constitution
Emily S. Bremer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by
an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Emily S. Bremer, The Unwritten Administrative Constitution, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 1215 (2015).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/6
1215 
THE UNWRITTEN ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 
Emily S. Bremer* 
Abstract 
It is widely accepted that the powers of the federal government flow 
from the U.S. Constitution. Yet in practice, most federal power is 
exercised through administrative agencies, institutions not mentioned in 
the Constitution. Since the New Deal Era, administrative law—the 
seemingly disparate set of rules governing agency action that are found 
in statutes, judicial decisions, and executive directives—has 
accommodated the emergence of this fourth branch of government not 
contemplated by the Framers. Familiar principles, including the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, and individual liberties, permeate 
administrative law. But these principles cannot be expressly located in 
the U.S. Constitution. So what is their legal and theoretical foundation? 
And how are they found in administrative law? 
This Article argues that administrative law provides an unwritten 
constitution governing federal administrative agencies. American 
administrative law is illuminated law through the lens of constitutional 
theory, and particularly principles of British constitutionalism. This 
Article shows that administrative law rules, though not formally 
entrenched, perform essential constitutional functions where the written 
Constitution has little or no application. These functions include 
constituting government agencies, determining institutional boundaries, 
establishing the government–citizen relationship, and protecting 
fundamental values. 
This unwritten constitution theory provides a legal and theoretical 
foundation for ensuring that the administrative state operates 
consistently with constitutional principles. It also legitimates 
administrative common law and illuminates political obligations to 
respect constitutional principles in administrative law development and 
reform.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional principles predominate in administrative law, the 
body of seemingly disparate legal requirements that controls the 
exercise of federal power through the modern administrative apparatus.1 
Administrative law is found in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 
and in an array of other statutes, federal judicial decisions, and 
executive directives that establish crosscutting requirements that 
generally apply to all agencies. Operating at a level above the laws that 
define individual, substantive fields of administration, administrative 
law more generally defines agency authority, determines agency 
structure, establishes minimal procedural requirements for agency 
action, measures the validity of agency decisions, and dictates the 
relationships between agencies and the three primary branches of the 
federal government.2 Familiar constitutional concerns—the separation 
of powers, rule of law, and protection for individual liberties—are often 
at the heart of these requirements.3 Reflecting this reality, much 
administrative law scholarship focuses on constitutional issues.4 
Yet these seemingly constitutive components of administrative law 
rarely derive from the U.S. Constitution. While the Constitution’s first 
three articles define the respective authority and relationships among 
Congress,5 the President,6 and the Judiciary,7 there is no article similarly 
devoted to administrative agencies.8 Indeed, it is widely agreed that the 
rise of the modern administrative state has significantly altered the 
original institutional structure created by the Constitution.9 Discrete 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., The Expansion of American Administrative Law, 30 HARV. 
L. REV. 430, 439 (1917) (noting that administrative law “concerns the machinery of 
transmission of governmental will from the point of its origin to the point of its application”). 
 2. STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: 
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 3 (5th ed. 2002). Administrative law thus excludes the substantive 
and procedural rules that define the many individual fields of administration, such as labor law, 
environmental law, food and drug law, etc. See id. (“Administrative law deals with the more 
general principles and rules that cut across the particular substantive fields to embrace all forms 
of administrative activity.”). 
 3. See infra Part III; see, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as 
Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 484 (2010) (explaining that “a fair 
amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law”). 
 4. See generally, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: 
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (articulating 
examples of constitutional issues that arise in administrative law). 
 5. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 6. See id. art. II. 
 7. See id. art. III. 
 8. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Governmental Practice and Presidential Direction: 
Lessons from the Antebellum Republic?, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 659, 660 (2009) (“[T]here is a 
hole in the Constitution where administration might have been.”). 
 9. See infra Section I.A. 
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provisions of the Constitution rarely mandate administrative law rules. 
For example, while the Due Process Clause imposes certain procedural 
requirements on agency adjudication,10 it has only limited application to 
rulemaking.11 Often, the constitutional concerns that animate 
administrative law are not tethered to any particular constitutional 
provision.12 The phenomenon is particularly noticeable in 
administrative common law, where courts frequently appeal to 
background constitutional principles in crafting administrative rules that 
are neither mandated by the Constitution nor required by statute.13 
Congressional and executive contributions to administrative law often 
have a similarly “small-c” or quasi-constitutional14 character.15 
This Article argues that administrative law has evolved into an 
unwritten constitution that governs the administrative power not 
contemplated by the U.S. Constitution. This Article establishes this 
theory by examining American administrative law through the lens of 
constitutional theory, particularly principles of British constitutionalism. 
While the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution (in the 
sense that there is no codified document called “The Constitution”), it is 
governed by a constitutional framework marked by certain fundamental 
principles that find expression in statutes, judicial decisions, and the 
customs and practices of political institutions. The legal instruments that 
make up this so-called unwritten constitution are identified by reference 
to the constitutional functions they perform.16  
                                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 288 n.4 
(1974) (“[T]he Due Process Clause forbids an agency to use evidence in a way that forecloses 
an opportunity to offer a contrary presentation.”). 
 11. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) 
(“There must be a limit to individual argument in such matters [of Due Process] if government 
is to go on.”); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 378 (1908) (holding that a state does not 
violate due process when it authorizes improvements following charter provisions and without 
notice to landowners). 
 12. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 481, 486–87 (defining and explaining the components of 
the term “constitutional common law”). 
 13. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2012) (exploring the constitutional character of administrative common 
law). 
 14. Although some may ascribe different meanings to the terms “small-c” and “quasi-
constitutional,” they are for my purposes interchangeable. 
 15. Several scholars have examined the quasi-constitutional status of federal statutes. See, 
e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010) (discussing how “political contrivances have become 
entrenched, indeed to the point of molding the Constitution itself”); Daniel A. Farber, 
Legislative Constitutionalism in a System of Judicial Supremacy, in THE LEAST EXAMINED 
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 431 (Richard W. Bauman 
& Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (noting that congressional rules “at least deserve to be called quasi-
constitutional”). 
 16. See generally BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL 
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Applying this analysis to American administrative law, this Article 
argues that administrative law performs constitutional functions: 
creating and ordering important political institutions, authorizing and 
limiting the exercise of government power, and defining relationships 
both among government institutions and between the government and 
citizens.17 As in the British system, this constitutional order is 
“unwritten” in that it is not codified in the Constitution. 18 Instead, its 
principles are found in statutes, judicial decisions, and executive policy 
directives that authorize, regulate, and limit the exercise of sovereign 
power19 through the now well-established20 “fourth branch” of the 
federal government.21 While this unwritten administrative constitution 
is not formally entrenched, it has proven remarkably enduring and has 
evolved to become the primary means through which fundamental 
constitutional values are extended into the modern administrative 
context.22 
Viewing administrative law as an unwritten constitution has various 
beneficial implications. At the broadest level, it provides a theoretical 
and legal foundation for integrating the modern administrative state, 
despite its apparent inconsistencies with the written Constitution, into 
the federal constitutional structure. By providing a way to “escape the 
                                                                                                                     
FUNCTIONALITY (2009). 
 17. Cf. Tom Ginsburg, Written Constitutions and the Administrative State: On the 
Constitutional Character of Administrative Law, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 117–
18 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010) (arguing that in the comparative 
context, administrative law has a constitutional character). 
 18. Cf. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 45 (1890) (arguing that “the great body of American constitutional law cannot be found in 
the written instruments, which we call our constitutions”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution 
Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 411 (2007) (arguing that most constitutional work 
in the American legal system is resolved “by legal norms existing outside what we traditionally 
think of as ‘the Constitution’”). 
 19. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 1. 
 20. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1232 (1994) (“[T]he essential features of the modern administrative state have, for 
more than half a century, been taken as unchallengeable postulates by virtually all players in the 
legal and political worlds.”); Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 369 (1989) (“We all live, as we all know, in an administrative state.”). 
 21. The term “fourth branch of government” was originally used as an epithet, but is used 
today as a common term for the administrative state. See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH 
STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 38–39 (1937); see 
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & 
PROCESS 32 (5th ed. 2009). 
 22. See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 285–86 (2012) (discussing the 
“change in the role of central government” throughout American history and how it affects our 
understanding of constitutional history). 
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difficulty of fitting the ‘round peg’ of administrative government into 
the ‘square hole’ of the nation’s constitutional culture,”23 the unwritten 
constitution theory coherently explains administrative agencies’ place in 
the federal government.24 It also provides a foundation for ensuring that 
agencies operate consistently with the nation’s normative commitment 
to the principle of constitutionalism. This in turn may help legitimate 
modern administrative government.25  
More concretely, the theory explains and justifies the courts’ 
development of core administrative law requirements through the 
creation of administrative common law.26 The courts’ development and 
use of federal common law rules is controversial, particularly in 
constitutional doctrine.27 Yet much administrative law is federal 
common law, and it often has a constitutional dimension. For example, 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.28 does 
not even cite the APA’s judicial review provisions in establishing the 
test for determining when a court must defer to an agency’s statutory 
interpretation.29 The Chevron doctrine is commonly understood as a 
prime example of administrative common law. And it has important 
constitutional consequences: ratifying Congress’s practice of delegating 
legislative authority to agencies, ensuring that agencies do not act 
beyond the scope of delegated authority, and defining the courts’ 
relationships with both Congress and the agencies. Administrative 
common law doctrines such as Chevron are essential to administrative 
law, but scholars have struggled to justify them. The unwritten 
constitution theory puts administrative common law in a broad 
institutional context and provides a solid, structural foundation for the 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out 
About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 6 (2009) (footnote omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 24. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative 
State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) (noting 
the embedded status of administrative agencies in the federal bureaucracy); Robert L. Rabin, 
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1986) (“Although 
Congress and the courts have never fashioned a coherent theory of administrative government, 
fundamental questions about the scope of regulatory power have often been put to rest by 
prescription . . . .”). 
 25. The administrative state is surely here to stay, but so too are doubts about its constitutional 
legitimacy. See generally, e.g., Lawson, supra note 20 (arguing that the administrative state is 
unconstitutional). 
 26. Cf. Paul R. Verkuil, Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 685, 685–86, 706–08 (1986) (comparing British and American administrative 
law as a means of understanding the evolution of public law in dominant common law 
countries). 
 27. See infra Section IV.A. 
 28. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 29. See id. at 865–66. 
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practice. It explains why, in the administrative context, federal common 
law is necessary to preserve the separation of powers and other 
fundamental constitutional values. The theory has implications beyond 
the courts, too, illuminating congressional, executive, and 
administrative obligations to contribute to the development and 
protection of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution.  
Part I of this Article explores the constitutional character of 
administrative law. With the written Constitution largely silent on the 
subject of administration, administrative law has evolved to perform the 
functions ordinarily associated with constitutions, including constituting 
administrative institutions, defining institutional boundaries, 
establishing the agency–citizen relationship, and protecting core 
political values. Though not formally entrenched, this unwritten 
constitutional order has proven remarkably stable and has facilitated the 
modern administrative state’s integration into the federal government’s 
original, tripartite structure. Part II first identifies the legal instruments 
that compose the unwritten administrative constitution. It elaborates on 
administrative law’s constitutional functions through an examination of 
key administrative statutes. Part II then identifies additional components 
of the unwritten constitution found in judicial common law and 
executive directives. Part III explores the substantive constitutional 
values protected by this unwritten constitutional order. Through this 
discussion, Part III extracts general political duties that flow from 
recognizing administrative law’s constitutional character. Finally, Part 
IV explores more concrete normative consequences of the unwritten 
constitution theory for evaluating the legitimacy of administrative 
common law and for guiding legislative reform efforts. 
I.  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER 
Most of the work of the modern federal government is performed by 
administrative agencies, institutions that are legislatively created and 
not so much as mentioned in the U.S. Constitution. Where the 
Constitution is silent, however, administrative law has evolved to 
perform essential constitutional functions. The statutes, judicial 
decisions, and executive directives that perform these functions make 
up an unwritten constitution that governs the fourth branch of 
government not contemplated by the written Constitution. Though these 
legal instruments are neither entrenched nor endowed with higher law 
status, they provide an essential legal and theoretical foundation for 
extending fundamental constitutional principles to administrative 
agencies. 
7
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A.  Accommodating the Rise of the Administrative State 
The Constitution has almost nothing to say about administration.30 It 
speaks of Congress, the President, and the federal courts,31 but not of 
administrative agencies.32 Indeed, it is generally agreed that there is 
significant tension, if not outright conflict,33 between the institutional 
structure erected by the Constitution and the reality of the modern 
administrative state.34 For example, whereas the Constitution divides 
sovereign power between three distinct branches,35 individual 
administrative agencies typically may exercise the powers of all three.36 
And agencies exercise these powers free from the particular 
requirements that the Constitution establishes to restrain and regulate 
each respective power. Thus, agencies exercise delegated legislative 
power free of the bicameralism and presentment requirements that apply 
to congressional exercises of legislative power.37 The rise of the 
administrative state thus “complicated American constitutional law 
generally, presenting issues not anticipated by the framers of the 
Constitution,”38 and rarely answered by the Constitution’s text.39 
There is nonetheless little doubt that the administrative state is a 
permanent feature of the federal government. Even those who argue that 
administrative agencies are unconstitutional view the agencies’ 
                                                                                                                     
 30. E.g., Metzger, supra note 13, at 1337; Strauss, supra note 4, at 597. 
 31. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. 
 32. Mashaw, supra note 8, at 659–60. 
 33. Some have argued that the administrative state is unconstitutional. E.g., Lawson, 
supra note 20, at 1231. The more common view, however, is that the administrative state merely 
raises manageable constitutional tensions. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 13, at 1337–41.  
 34. E.g., Metzger, supra note 13, at 1336 (“That our national administrative state poorly 
fits our constitutional framework is well known.”); see also, e.g., Lawson, supra note 20, at 
1231 (“Faced with a choice between the administrative state and the Constitution, the architects 
of our modern government chose the administrative state, and their choice has stuck.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447–48 (1987) 
(explaining that the New Deal “altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to 
suggest that something akin to a constitutional amendment had taken place”).  
 35. The Constitution creates and distinguishes between the Congress, the President, and 
the courts, but does not provide a clear way to distinguish between legislative, executive, and 
judicial powers. See Lawson, supra note 20, at 1238 & n.45. 
 36. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1336–37 (“Where the Constitution divides legislative, 
executive, and adjudicatory power among the three branches and guarantees due process, 
modern administrative schemes instead consolidate all three functions in a single agency . . . .”). 
 37. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the 
Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory State, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 165, 166–67 (1992) (stating that “a great deal of lawmaking and statutory interpretation 
has been delegated to agencies”). 
 38. Id. at 165. 
 39. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1338 (discussing the Constitution’s silence on matters 
of administrative law). 
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abolition as “unthinkable,”40 for both pragmatic and political reasons. 
Administrative agencies today bear substantial responsibility for 
carrying out the day-to-day work of the federal government.41 Without 
them, the federal government could not fulfill its modern regulatory, 
economic, and social responsibilities.42 Since the New Deal, the 
Supreme Court has consistently rejected constitutional challenges to the 
core features of the federal administrative apparatus.43 Only twice in its 
history has the Court invalidated a statute for unconstitutionally failing 
to provide an “intelligible principle” to guide an agency’s exercise of 
delegated legislative authority.44 Other constitutional arguments against 
administrative structures have had similarly limited success.45 The 
upshot is that “although the Court may tinker with administrative 
arrangements at the edges, the core structure of the modern 
administrative state is here to stay.”46 
It is troubling that the Constitution has so little to say about this 
important and enduring component of the federal government. 
“Virtually every major aspect of contemporary life is affected by 
government regulation.”47 Citizens are accordingly more likely to come 
into contact with federal power in an administrative context than in any 
other context. Most citizens will never be charged with a crime and thus 
be affected by the protections of criminal procedure; they may never 
                                                                                                                     
 40. McCutchen, supra note 24, at 41–42. 
 41. See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (2d ed. 
2002); see also JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6 (1978) (“In virtually every relevant respect, the administrative 
process has become a fourth branch of government, comparable in the scope of its authority and 
the impact of its decision making to the three more familiar constitutional branches.”).  
 42. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1338 (noting that “the federal government’s dominance 
reflects the changed nature of the national economy and society”). 
 43. Id.  
 44. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001); see A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (holding that a statute does not state an 
“intelligible principle”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (same). 
 45. There is a surprising variety of administrative structures, even among the “Executive 
Branch” agencies. See generally DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED 
STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES (2012) (describing the “diversity of federal agencies”). This 
Article engages neither these nuances nor the broader distinction between “Executive” and 
“independent” agencies, because its focus is not on agencies, but on the constitutional character 
of administrative law. 
 46. Metzger, supra note 13, at 1339. 
 47. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public 
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New 
Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 924 (2009); see also FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 
U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[P]erhaps more values today are affected by 
[agency] decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart.”); 
Lawson, supra note 20, at 1236 (“There is now virtually no significant aspect of life that is not 
in some way regulated by the federal government.”). 
9
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need to claim the speech or assembly protections of the First 
Amendment or invoke the Fifth Amendment to defend their property 
from government seizure. Rather, the average citizen will confront the 
power of the state “in myriad petty interactions,” when filing for social 
security benefits, applying for a passport or visa, financing their child’s 
education with federal grants and loans, or securing building or business 
permits from federal authorities.48 “It is here that the rubber meets the 
road for constitutionalism, where predictability and curbs on 
arbitrariness are least likely to be noticed but more likely to affect a 
large number of citizens.”49 
Fortunately, where the Constitution is silent, administrative law steps 
into the breach. Statutes, judicial decisions, and executive policies 
establish uniform procedures and requirements that define, regulate, and 
limit the exercise of agency authority.50 These legal instruments are 
often explicitly designed to promote substantive constitutional values, 
such as the separation of powers, rule of law, and individual rights.51 
But if these seemingly constitutional rules do not come from the 
Constitution, then what legal or theoretical foundation supports them? 
B.  Constitutionalism Where the Constitution Is Silent 
The inquiry begins with the most basic question: what is a 
constitution? Constitutional theory and comparative constitutional law 
provide a wealth of identifying characteristics and theoretical 
distinctions that help answer this question. Constitutions may be written 
or unwritten. They may embody the principle of constitutionalism, or 
they may not. They may be political or legal. They may be formally 
entrenched, or be otherwise enduring and stable without being formally 
entrenched.52 But all constitutions, regardless of which of these 
characteristics they possess, serve certain key functions within a polity. 
Examining administrative law through this lens, we find at its heart the 
functional constitution of the administrative state.  
Written constitutions are the easiest to identify—you need only find 
the codified document called “The Constitution.”53 As others have 
observed, the terminology here, though well established, is unfortunate 
and inaccurate.54 The core difficulty is that “[t]he unhappily misleading 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 118. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See infra Part II. 
 51. See infra Part III.  
 52. See infra Section I.C. 
 53. See Young, supra note 18, at 410. 
 54. See, e.g., id. (arguing that “the American ‘constitution’ consists of a much wider range 
of legal materials than the document ratified in 1789 and its subsequent amendments”). 
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phrase, ‘written constitution’ really means ‘codified constitution.’”55 
The United States thus has a written or codified constitution because its 
“principal constitutional rules” find specific canonical formulation in a 
single document called “The Constitution.”56 In contrast, the British 
have a so-called unwritten constitution.57 While “much (indeed, nearly 
all) of the [British] constitution is written, somewhere,”58 the United 
Kingdom lacks a single document codifying its principal constitutional 
rules.59 In the interest of accuracy, some scholars have eschewed the 
traditional terminology of “written” and “unwritten” constitutions, 
instead referring respectively to “canonical” and “extracanonical” 
constitutional norms.60 This approach has some appeal, but this Article 
nonetheless adheres to the traditional terminology. For despite their 
deficiencies, the terms “written” and “unwritten” remain familiar terms 
of art.61 
The distinction between written and unwritten constitutions takes on 
less importance once one recognizes that even written constitutions 
rarely contain all of a nation’s principal constitutional rules.62 This is 
true even in the United States.63 Indeed, “a cursory glance at the 
American constitutional text suffices to illustrate that notwithstanding 
its almost sacred status in the USA it does not contain a complete code 
of all [of] America’s constitutional rules, nor even of all the important 
ones.”64 This observation has served as the foundation of several 
scholars’ work urging the identification of constitutional principles and 
meaning outside the written Constitution.65 Professor Ernest Young 
urges us to consider the possibility of a “constitution outside the 
                                                                                                                     
 55. ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 7 (2003); see also Joseph Raz, On the Authority and 
Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 152, 153 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (identifying canonical formulation as a 
defining feature of constitutions). 
 56. TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 7; see Raz, supra note 55, at 153. 
 57. TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 7. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Young, supra note 18, at 410. 
 60. Id. at 415. 
 61. See TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 7 n.4. 
 62. See id. at 9 (arguing that “all constitutions are (at least in part) unwritten” because no 
constitution can contain all constitutional rules).  
 63. Id. at 8–9. 
 64. Id. at 8. See generally TIEDEMAN, supra note 18 (exploring the phenomenon of 
unwritten norms in American constitutional law). 
 65. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012); Matthew S.R. Palmer, Using Constitutional Realism to Identify 
the Complete Constitution: Lessons from an Unwritten Constitution, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 587, 
588–89 (2006) (identifying scholarship that “shows signs of recognizing the existence of 
something more than text in a constitution”). 
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[C]onstitution.”66 Dr. Matthew S.R. Palmer, a New Zealand public law 
scholar, urges realism in constitutional discourse, arguing that “an 
adequate conception of a complete constitution would encompass those 
elements that significantly influence how public power is exercised in 
reality,” even if those elements are not found in the written 
Constitution.67 And Professor Akhil Amar offers a “panoramic account 
of the American constitutional experience” by exploring how materials 
extrinsic to the text of the Constitution give that text meaning and 
effect.68  
As mentioned earlier in this Article, the written Constitution makes 
no mention of the administrative state69—and yet there is a fundamental 
set of rules governing the exercise of public authority through the 
administrative apparatus.70 This Article argues that these rules form the 
unwritten constitution of the administrative state. Scholars and 
practitioners have long recognized that the administrative component of 
the government is unique and must be constituted and regulated by rules 
and principles not found in the Constitution. In a 1938 lecture, Professor 
James Landis said, “it is obvious that the resort to the administrative 
process is not, as some suppose, simply an extension of executive 
power.”71 Rather, the administrative state arose in response to a need, 
created by the industrial revolution, for an utterly new kind of 
governance.72 Instead of merely enforcing existing laws, administrative 
agencies were called upon “to provide for the efficient functioning of 
the economic processes of the state,”73 using “an assemblage of rights 
normally exercisable by government as a whole.”74 In this account, the 
rise of the administrative state demanded a new philosophy of 
government that could define the administrative branch of government 
and its relationship to the other three branches of government.75 
Administrative law has evolved to meet this need.76 This reality is 
evident even in the most critical accounts of the administrative state. 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 
(2007). 
 67. Palmer, supra note 65, at 589. 
 68. AMAR, supra note 65, at xvi. 
 69. See supra Section I.A. 
 70. See infra Parts II–III. 
 71. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 15 (1974). 
 72. See generally id. at 6–18 (describing how the industrial revolution influenced the 
administrative state). 
 73. Id. at 16. 
 74. Id. at 15. 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 17 (recognizing the significant need “for differentiation in the nature 
and composition of administrative agencies and in their relationship to the other branches of 
government”). 
 76. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 10–11 (noting the relationship between 
the administrative state and the Legislative Branch). 
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For example, Professor Gary Lawson argues that “[t]he post-New Deal 
administrative state is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal 
system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless constitutional 
revolution.”77 The written Constitution says nothing of administration, 
and so administrative law has evolved to supply the unwritten 
constitutional rules required in the wake of the administrative 
revolution. 
When constitutional principles are unwritten, as are those governing 
the administrative state, how does one identify them? By reference to 
the one thing all constitutions have in common: the functions they 
perform.78 The essence of a constitution is that it defines, orders, and 
limits the exercise of political authority within the state:  
The constitution of a state may be described as the 
definition of the order and structure of the body politic, 
while constitutional law consists of those fundamental 
principles and rules in accordance with which the 
government is constructed and its orderly administration is 
conducted. Constitutional law may be described as the 
anatomy and physiology of the body politic.79  
In the broadest sense, then, “[a] constitution is about public power and 
how it is exercised.”80 So too is administrative law.  At its core are the 
formal instruments that order the administrative component of the 
federal government.81  
The central importance of function is manifest in the principle of 
constitutionalism, which holds that political power is created and must 
be legally controlled.82 There is an important distinction between 
constitutions and the principle of constitutionalism. Constitutions are 
fundamental legal documents or orders. In contrast, constitutionalism is 
a philosophical commitment to the principled restraint of political 
power. The distinction is important because constitutions and 
constitutionalism do not always go together. A written constitution may 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Lawson, supra note 20, at 1231 (footnote omitted). 
 78. See Young, supra note 18, at 410 (“In a polity without a codified constitution, the 
content of ‘The Constitution’ must be derived functionally, not formally.”). 
 79. TIEDEMAN, supra note 18, at 16. 
 80. Palmer, supra note 65, at 588 
 81. See BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 8 (explaining the theoretical scope and definition of a 
constitution); see also Henry St. John Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties (1733–34), 
quoted in CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 3–4 (rev. 
ed. 1947) (defining “constitution” as “that assemblage of laws, institutions and customs, derived 
from certain fixed principles of reason, directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that 
compose the general system, according to which the community hath agreed to be governed”). 
 82. See BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 14 (defining the principle of constitutionalism); 
HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (5th ed. 2004) (same). 
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not adhere to the principle of constitutionalism, while a polity that 
observes the principle of constitutionalism may not have a written 
constitution.83  
For this Article’s purposes, the key point is that it is possible for a 
nation to have a legal order that functions consistently with 
constitutionalism in the absence of a written constitution. Britain is an 
excellent example,84 and the British experience suggests that the U.S. 
Constitution’s silence on the subject of administration poses no 
impediment to the creation and maintenance of a legal order that 
extends the principle of constitutionalism to the administrative context. 
To determine which rules within a legal order contribute to an unwritten 
constitution, we must determine which rules give effect to 
constitutionalism. To put it another way, we must identify the rules that 
perform constitutional functions.  
Although formulations differ among scholars,85 constitutions serve at 
least five primary functions. First, constitutions create and define the 
institutions of government—that is, they constitute the government.86 
Second, constitutions determine and establish the relationships among 
various government institutions.87 Third, constitutions regulate the 
relationship between the government and the governed.88 This includes 
defining the individual rights of citizens.89 Fourth, constitutions espouse 
political principles, which are typically understood to express a 
common ideology or “the common beliefs of the population about the 
way their society should be governed.”90 Finally, constitutions often 
entrench the rules and structures they create, making them difficult or 
impervious to change.91 Part II of this Article explores how 
administrative law performs many, albeit not all,92 of these 
constitutional functions. 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 15 (“Some regimes boast constitutional texts, but we 
would not call them constitutionalist. Others are constitutionalist in principle but have decided, 
for whatever reason, to do without a written charter.”).  
 84. See TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 7–8. 
 85. Compare TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 3 (listing three main tasks of constitutions, 
including creating institutions, regulating relationships among those institutions, and regulating 
relationships between government and citizens), with Raz, supra note 55, at 153–54 (setting out 
seven features of constitutions), and Young, supra note 18, at 411–12 (identifying three primary 
functions of constitutions, including constituting the government, identifying individual rights 
against government, and entrenchment).  
 86. See TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 3; Raz, supra note 55, at 153; Young, supra note 18, 
at 411–12. 
 87. See TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 3; Raz, supra note 55, at 153. 
 88. See TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 3; Raz, supra note 55, at 153–54. 
 89. Young, supra note 18, at 412. 
 90. Raz, supra note 55, at 153–54. 
 91. Id. at 153; Young, supra note 18, at 412. 
 92. See infra Part I.C. 
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It bears noting that a constitution may perform its functions through 
either political or legal means. A political constitution holds the 
government to account for constitutional wrongs through political 
means and political institutions.93 Examples of political components of 
the Constitution can be found where the political question doctrine 
operates. For instance, whether legislative rules governing impeachment 
violate the Impeachment Trial Clause94 is nonjusticiable and must be 
resolved within the legislature itself.95 “A legal constitution, on the 
other hand, is one which imagines that the principal means, and the 
principal institution, through which the government is held to account is 
the law and the court-room.”96 As will be discussed, the unwritten 
administrative constitution includes political components, such as 
statutes and executive orders that subject administrative agencies to 
political oversight.97 It also has legal components that are primarily 
given effect through judicial review and administrative common law. 
C.  On Entrenchment and Related Concepts 
Entrenchment, a feature or function98 typically associated with 
constitutional rules, warrants early, independent examination. A rule is 
entrenched if formal protections make it harder to change than an 
ordinary law. For example, Article V entrenches the written 
Constitution by establishing a special, onerous procedure for 
constitutional amendments.99 Rules may be entrenched to various 
degrees. That is, a rule may be entrenched in the sense that it “may not 
be altered ever, may not be altered for a certain length of time, and/or 
may not be altered except by extraordinary procedures.”100 Article V 
itself demonstrates this point. The provision is best known for 
establishing an extraordinary procedure for constitutional amendments. 
But Article V also prohibited amendments—at least until 1808—to 
certain provisions of Article I related to the constitutional compromise 
                                                                                                                     
 93. TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 18. 
 94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 95. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding that legislative rules 
governing the Impeachment Trial Clause are nonjusticiable and thus may not be resolved by the 
Judiciary). 
 96. TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 19. 
 97. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (articulating executive policy 
on regulatory oversight reform). 
 98. Compare Raz, supra note 55, at 153 (identifying entrenchment as a “feature” of 
constitutions), with Young, supra note 18, at 426 (describing entrenchment as a “function” of 
constitutions). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 100. Larry Alexander, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 
2 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
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on slavery.101 Furthermore, Article V absolutely prohibits constitutional 
amendments that would deprive any state “of its equal Suffrage in the 
Senate” without that state’s consent.102 The provision thus includes 
three different degrees of entrenchment applicable to three different 
categories of constitutional rules. Regardless of degree, entrenchment is 
a common, albeit not universal, feature of constitutions.103 Although it 
is less common, ordinary statutes may also be entrenched to some 
degree.104 
Entrenchment is related to, but distinct from, the notion that 
constitutional rules have “higher law” status.105 A constitution has such 
status if it is understood to be superior to all other laws in the same 
system, such that an “ordinary law which conflicts with the constitution 
is invalid or inapplicable.”106 Again, the written Constitution is higher 
law by this definition.107 If a statutory or other ordinary law conflicts 
with a provision of the Constitution, it is a nullity.108 This principle is 
enforced primarily by the courts, via the doctrine of judicial review,109 
because the Constitution is, for the most part, justiciable.110 The concept 
                                                                                                                     
 101. U.S. CONST. art. V; see id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, 4. 
 102. Id. art. V. 
 103. See TOMKINS, supra note 55, at 16 (“[T]he [English] constitution is said to be 
unentrenched because there is nothing in it that cannot be changed.”). 
 104. See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A 
Reply to Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1779–82 (2003) (discussing 
“examples of binding entrenchment in the history of legislative bodies”); see also Julian N. 
Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. 
B. FOUND. RES. J. 379 (discussing the difficulties of legislative entrenchment); Michael J. 
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997) 
(same); Palmer, supra note 65, at 609 (defining a New Zealand statute that “may only be 
amended by a 75 percent majority vote in Parliament or a majority in a national referendum” as 
“entrenched”). 
 105. Some scholars treat these two concepts as one. See, e.g., Young, supra note 18, at 426 
(suggesting that “entrenchment may be all that sets the canonical Constitution apart from the 
rest of [the] legal system”). There is undoubtedly some overlap. A rule with the status of higher 
law likely has a limited degree of inherent entrenchment in the sense that it is impervious to 
amendment or repeal by implication. But without formal entrenchment, such a rule remains 
susceptible to express amendment or repeal via “ordinary . . . means.” Id. 
 106. Raz, supra note 55, at 153. 
 107. Cf. TIEDEMAN, supra note 18, at 16 (stating that “the fundamental principles which 
form the constitution of a state cannot be created by any governmental or popular edict”). See 
generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008) (examining the historical context and political philosophy behind 
the tradition of the “higher law” status of the U.S. Constitution). 
 108. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 109. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–79 (1803).  
 110. Cf. Raz, supra note 55, at 153 (identifying justiciability as a feature of constitutions). 
Judicial supremacy in interpreting and enforcing the Constitution is not absolute. See, e.g., 
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–15 (1962) (noting that some constitutional questions are 
nonjusticiable political questions). Nor is it entirely accepted. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagel, 
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of higher law centers on the relationship between rules within the same 
legal system, determining which rule governs in the event of a conflict. 
In contrast, entrenchment is about change, not conflict. A rule is 
entrenched when it is protected, to some degree, from being changed or 
eliminated. While an entrenched rule may also be higher law—as in the 
case of the written Constitution—it is also possible for a rule to possess 
only one of these two distinct features. For example, Congress could 
entrench an ordinary statute, but doing so would not give the statute 
higher law status. It may be more difficult to amend or repeal such a 
statute, but in the event of a conflict between the entrenched statute and 
the Constitution, the latter would prevail. 
Some scholars willing to recognize the existence of constitutional 
norms outside the written Constitution further argue that such norms are 
entrenched or endowed with higher law status.111 For example, 
Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn recently published a 
book that “presents a nontraditional framework for thinking about 
American constitutionalism.”112 This framework “focuses on the 
primary instruments of the political process itself—statutes, executive 
orders, congressional-executive agreements, agency rules—and reveals 
how those political contrivances have become entrenched, indeed to the 
point of molding the Constitution itself.”113 The project, which is the 
culmination of much previous work, is quite directly a response to what 
the authors perceive as the judiciary’s failure to “generate important 
changes in the Constitution” by recognizing certain social and economic 
rights.114 Statutes and other political instruments, however, have 
established some of these rights.115 By characterizing these political 
instruments as having a constitutional character, the authors aim to 
establish that the instruments have been entrenched through the political 
process, rather than through the usual means of judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution.116 The practical consequence, if the theory is accepted, 
is that certain rights created by statute are formally protected against 
future change or revocation. 
                                                                                                                     
Judicial Supremacy and the Settlement Function, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 849 (1998) 
(criticizing the view of judicial supremacy without qualification).  
 111. See generally Young, supra note 18, at 413–14 (“Other scholars, from Karl Llewellyn 
in the 1930s to Bruce Ackerman, William Eskridge, John Ferejohn, and many others today, 
have . . . . insisted on treating . . . extracanonical norms as ‘higher law[]’ . . . .”); see also 
ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 1 (arguing that “political contrivances have become 
entrenched, indeed to the point of molding the Constitution itself”). 
 112. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 15, at 1. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 4. 
 115. See, e.g., id. at 6, 9 (noting several examples of major Supreme Court decisions 
modifying constitutional provisions that rose out of statutory enactments).  
 116. See id. at 5 (stating that “statutes commonly provide positive rights to people” and that 
some positive rights “have a Large ‘C’ Constitutional basis”).  
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One could plausibly argue that administrative law is functionally 
entrenched.117 Indeed, one of the remarkable features of American 
administrative law is the longevity of its institutions and basic legal 
requirements. Once an agency is created, it is rarely destroyed.118 And the 
APA has proven nearly impervious to change since its enactment in 
1946.119 This kind of stability is also a common feature of administrative 
structures in other nations. In the context of comparative administrative 
law, one scholar notes that administrative institutions may be generally 
more stable and enduring than many constitutions.120 While some legal 
norms of the administrative state have evolved with changes in technology, 
ideas, and politics,121 administrative structures have generally proven quite 
durable. Even some key legal norms, such as the APA’s procedures, seem 
to meet the constitutional “criteria of de facto entrenchment and substantive 
reach.”122 
But “functional entrenchment” isn’t really entrenchment at all—it’s 
stability. Though frequently conflated, stability and entrenchment are 
distinct concepts.123 Entrenchment is a formal protection against 
change, while stability is itself the absence of change. Constitutional 
rules are entrenched in the hopes of producing—or at least increasing 
the likelihood of—stability. Stability is the end, and entrenchment is 
only a means to achieve it. It is fallacious to conclude that 
administrative law is entrenched merely because it has achieved the 
stability that is the goal of, but in practice eludes, some nations’ 
entrenched constitutions. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 117. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2–3 (1982) 
(seeking a solution to the functional entrenchment of federal statutes). 
 118. One commonly cited exception is the Interstate Commerce Commission, which was 
eliminated in 1995. Its remaining authority was transferred to the Surface Transportation Board. 
See 49 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). Another notable exception, in the author’s admittedly biased view, 
is the Administrative Conference of the United States. The Conference was also defunded in 
1995 and remained defunct until 2010. H.R. REP. No. 112-154, at 4 (2011). But the Conference 
was merely defunded; its organic statute was never repealed and its authority and mission were 
not transferred to another federal agency. See id. This example shows not only the difficulty of 
changing institutional structures but also the crucial distinction between formal law and 
functional reality. 
 119. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 20, at 1231–32 (discussing the New Deal model of 
administration as unchanged since the late 1930s). 
 120. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 122. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 125. 
 123. See, e.g., Raz, supra note 55, at 153 (distinguishing stability, entrenchment, and 
superiority as separate features of constitutions); cf. TIEDEMAN, supra note 18, at 77 (explaining 
that in the English system, “if an act of Parliament should be passed in accordance with some 
great public demand, the fact that it violated [unwritten constitutional] principles would not 
prevent its enforcement by the courts”). 
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The remarkable stability of American administrative law may well 
be explained by another characteristic it shares with other unwritten 
constitutions: it consists of fundamental principles that have evolved 
over time in response to the nation’s political needs.124 The principles 
that form the administrative constitution were not “created by any 
governmental or popular edict,” but are rather “found imbedded in the 
national character” and have been “developed in accordance with the 
national growth.”125 If “[c]onstitutions are effective only so far as their 
principles have their roots imbedded in the national character, and 
consequently constitute a faithful reflection of the national will,”126 then 
it is easy to see how administrative law has grown to be such an 
enduring component of the nation’s constitutional order. Administrative 
law’s evolution over more than a century of lawmaking, regulation, 
crises, political compromises, and legal challenges, has forged a legal 
order that truly reflects the nation’s needs, expectations, and values.127 
Despite its stability, administrative law is neither entrenched nor 
higher law. Formally, it remains ordinary law that can be changed by 
Congress at will through the ordinary legislative process. Congress 
could amend the APA128 tomorrow with no need to amend the 
Constitution or resort to extraordinary procedures. A court could not 
refuse to give effect to a properly enacted amendment to the APA or 
other administrative statute on the ground that the change violated the 
fundamental principles of the unwritten administrative constitution. 
Rather, such an amendment “would have to be taken as a repeal of the 
constitutional rule previously enunciated.”129 This is the “limitation of 
the unwritten constitution, which finds no authority whatever in the 
written Constitution, and yet as long as public opinion does not undergo 
a change, it is as binding as any written limitation, and even more 
binding than some of the plainest directions of the written 
Constitution.”130 Similarly, administrative law is not higher law, as 
evidenced by its relationship to both the Constitution and ordinary 
                                                                                                                     
 124. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 65, at 627 (using a comparison with New Zealand’s 
unwritten constitution to illustrate similar influences in the United States). 
 125. TIEDEMAN, supra note 18, at 16. 
 126. Id. at 18. 
 127. The creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 is conventionally 
understood to mark the beginning of modern administration, but some argue that administrative 
law has much deeper historical roots. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 3–4 (describing 
misperceptions regarding the history of administrative law). 
 128. Indeed, Congress has previously amended the APA via ordinary legislation. See Act 
of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54; Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 
250. 
 129. TIEDEMAN, supra note 18, at 53. 
 130. Id. 
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statutes. If an administrative law conflicts with the Constitution, the 
latter prevails.131 
There may be, however, an intermediate position between formal 
entrenchment and stability in fact. Government officials may recognize 
that certain legal instruments, even if not formally entrenched, are so 
fundamental to the political order that they should not be changed. This 
phenomenon is observable in other contexts, such as in prudential 
standing, abstention, and political question doctrines.132 These doctrines 
determine the circumstances in which prudent courts ought to refrain 
from exercising judicial authority. Such restraint is often exercised to 
protect fundamental constitutional values, such as the separation of 
powers or federalism.133 Administrative law rules may be entrenched in 
this sense, because they are essential to give effect to fundamental 
constitutional values in the administrative context. All branches of 
government should, as prudential matter, view the core rules that make 
up the unwritten administrative constitution as deserving special 
respect. This Article turns next to identifying these “core rules”134 
before examining in greater detail the substantive constitutional values 
these rules promote.135  
II.  THE UNWRITTEN ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION 
While administrative law does not derive from a written, formally 
entrenched constitution endowed with higher law status, it nonetheless 
performs the essential functions of any constitution. At the highest 
level, “[t]he subject matter of administrative law is, first and foremost, 
government and its operation.”136 More specifically, administrative law 
                                                                                                                     
 131. The APA arguably possesses some limited higher law status in the sense that it is 
protected from implied amendment or repeal. See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).  
 132. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163 (1997) (noting that prudential standing 
applies to legislation unless Congress expressly negates it); Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. 
Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626 (1986) (stating that the abstention doctrine arises 
“from strong policies counseling against the exercise of [jurisdiction in the District Court] where 
particular kinds of state proceedings have already been commenced”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 210 (1962) (“[I]t is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of 
the Federal Government . . . which gives rise to the ‘political question.’”).  
 133. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 252 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“[T]he political question doctrine is essentially a function of the separation of 
powers, existing to restrain courts from inappropriate interference in the business of the other 
branches of Government . . . .” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Goldwater 
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he political-
question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three 
branches of Government.”). 
 134. See infra Part II. 
 135. See infra Part III. 
 136. STRAUSS, supra note 41, at 1. 
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rules often serve the four functions of constitutions.137 They create and 
map important government institutions, regulate the boundaries among 
those institutions, establish the relationship between agencies and 
citizens, and protect and promote commonly held core values.  
This is not to say that all administrative law rules perform 
constitutional functions. Identifying the subset of rules that make up the 
administrative state’s unwritten constitution has its difficulties, and 
some indeterminacy may be unavoidable.138 At the same time, “[i]t is 
not sensible to conceive of every trivial influence on the exercise of 
public power as worthy of note as constitutional.”139 A functional 
analysis holds the best promise for addressing this difficulty.140 For this 
Article’s purposes, which do not include establishing the formal 
entrenchment of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution, some 
definitional indeterminacy is acceptable.141  
This Part seeks to identify, by reference to constitutional function, 
the most important “legal instruments that embody constitutionalism”142 
in the American administrative state. As in Great Britain and other 
nations governed by unwritten constitutions, qualifying legal 
instruments “clearly include legislation that influences the exercise of 
public power, to which can be added other formal instruments of the 
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government.”143 Upon an 
examination of key administrative statutes, the constitutional functions 
of administrative law are evident. Administrative common law and 
executive policy directives often have a similar constitutional 
functionality and provide essential additional components of the 
administrate state’s unwritten constitution.144 It bears noting, however, 
that the goal of this Part is to identify the most important components of 
the unwritten constitution, not to exhaust the possibilities.  
                                                                                                                     
 137. See infra Section II.A. 
 138. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 125 (“Without a clear rule that helps to identify 
particular norms as constitutional or not-constitutional, the boundaries of the category become 
fuzzy.”). 
 139. Palmer, supra note 65, at 595. 
 140. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 125 (“In considering what norms outside the 
constitution might be considered uncodified constitutional norms, it seems clear that those rules 
that are relatively enduring, and purport to regulate the relationship between the state and 
society, should be within the definition.”). 
 141. See infra notes 339–45 and accompanying text. 
 142. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 125. 
 143. Palmer, supra note 65, at 608; see TIEDEMAN, supra note 18, at 16–17. Administrative 
decisions, customs, and practices may also provide elements of the administrative constitution. 
See Palmer, supra note 65, at 608. Examining the role of such custom and practice is a worthy 
but significant undertaking. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 
113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (2013). That undertaking is mostly beyond the scope of this Article, 
but see infra Section IV.C.  
 144. See Young, supra note 18, at 420 (noting that the Constitution leaves room for other 
legal materials to fill in where there is a gap). 
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A.  Constitutional Functions of Administrative Statutes 
Much of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution is found in 
an array of statutes that establish “a legal framework for agency 
action.”145 The most important, of course, is the APA.146 This enduring 
law provides the basic framework for the administrative state. Enacted 
in 1946 with broad support,147 the APA was the culmination of more 
than a decade of examination and discussion of administrative 
processes.148 Efforts to make the federal administrative process more 
consistent and uniform had begun as early as 1929.149 The legislative 
history of the APA suggests that legislators at least implicitly 
understood that the statute’s passage was an event of constitutional 
import.150 Upon its adoption, Senator Pat McCarran, the Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, described the law in decidedly 
constitutional terms, as:  
a strongly marked, long sought, and widely heralded 
advance in democratic government. [The APA] embarks 
upon a new field of legislation of broad application in the 
“administrative” area of government lying between the 
traditional legislative and fundamental judicial processes on 
the one hand and authorized executive functions on the 
other. Although it is brief, it is a comprehensive charter of 
private liberty and a solemn undertaking of official 
fairness. It is intended as a guide to him who seeks fair play 
and equal rights under law, as well as to those invested with 
executive authority. It upholds law and yet lightens the 
burden of those on whom the law may impinge. It 
enunciates and emphasizes the tripartite form of our 
democracy and brings into relief the ever essential 
declaration that this is a government of law rather than of 
men.151 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the 
Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 305. 
 146. Cf. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 717, 719 (2005) (identifying the APA as “a framework setting out the default methods of 
decision making for administrative agencies”). 
 147. STRAUSS, supra note 41, at 191. 
 148. See generally K.C. Davis & Walter Gellhorn, Present at the Creation: Regulatory 
Reform Before 1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 516–17 (1986) (discussing the development of and 
ideology behind the APA). 
 149. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950) (“Concern over 
administrative impartiality and response to growing discontent was reflected in Congress as 
early as 1929.”); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1566 (1996) (identifying the “first 
legislation for constraining administrative agencies” in 1929). 
 150. See Shepherd, supra note 149, at 1571, 1576–77.  
 151. Pat McCarran, Foreword to ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
at iii (1946). 
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In other words, the APA was intended to incorporate principles of 
constitutionalism into the American administrative process.152 The APA 
is concerned with core constitutional principles, including separation of 
powers, the rule of law, and a commitment to the protection of 
individual liberty.153 
Beyond the APA, other statutes contribute to the administrative 
state’s unwritten constitution. These statutes are often crosscutting, 
governing how many or all “agencies of government operate on a day-
to-day basis in enforcing the law, making policy, and resolving 
disputes.”154 While not every provision of each statute performs a 
constitutional function, it is common for a single statute to perform 
multiple constitutional functions. The important point, however, is that 
administrative statutes are a crucial component of the administrative 
state’s unwritten constitution. 
1.  Constituting the Administrative State 
The most basic constitutional function of administrative statutes is 
constitutive: creating and mapping the institutions that form the federal 
administrative apparatus.155 The APA in a sense constitutes the 
administrative state, defining an “agency” as an “authority of the 
Government of the United States” aside from Congress, the courts, state 
or local governments, or military authorities.156 Other statutes are 
constitutive in more targeted ways, creating individual institutions for 
discrete administrative purposes.157 A particularly important (and 
surprising) example is the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA), 
which created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA).158 OIRA has since developed into the locus of executive 
                                                                                                                     
 152. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 489 (stating that procedural protection for formal 
agency adjudication provisions in the APA were in part due to concerns of due process). 
 153. See id. at 488–90. 
 154. Michael Asimow, Chair’s Foreword to FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
SOURCEBOOK, at iii (William F. Funk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2008). 
 155. See BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 70 (“One of the principal functions of a constitution, 
therefore, is to organize or coordinate the institutions of the polity.”); Raz, supra note 55, at 153 
(“[T]he constitution defines the constitution and powers of the main organs of the different 
branches of government.”); Young, supra note 18, at 432 (“The basic function of a constitution 
is to draw boundaries among the institutions of the government . . . .”). 
 156. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012); see also Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) (“[T]he APA apparently confers agency status on any administrative unit with substantial 
independent authority in the exercise of specific functions.”). 
 157. See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, §§ 202, 
204; 83 Stat. 852, 854–55 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342, 4344) (creating the Council on 
Environmental Quality, an agency within the Executive Office of the President, to oversee 
compliance with the Act). 
 158. Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform: From Ford to Clinton, REG., 
Winter 1997, at 20, 22. 
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oversight of administrative agencies.159  
Organic statutes perform much of administrative law’s constitutive 
work. An organic statute establishes an agency, defines that agency’s 
regulatory mission, and delineates the boundaries of the agency’s 
authority.160 Such statutes are the primary vehicles of substantive 
federal policy, and a significant proportion of any organic statute will 
therefore be utterly ordinary. But as the primary constitutive elements of 
the administrative constitution, these organic statutes cannot be ignored. 
For example, the Communications Act of 1934161 expressly 
“constituted” the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),162 
specifying the number, qualifications, compensation, terms of office, 
and method of appointing FCC commissioners.163 Similarly, the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 constitutes the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA),164 while the National Aeronautics and Space Act 
of 1958 constitutes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA).165 Other examples abound.166 
2.  Drawing Institutional Boundaries 
Other administrative statutes perform the constitutional function of 
defining the boundaries between the various institutions of the federal 
government. Such statutes determine the respective authority of federal 
institutions and regulate the relationships between federal administrative 
                                                                                                                     
 159. OIRA was initially charged with supervising the enforcement of the PRA. See id. Not 
long after, President Ronald Reagan “expanded OIRA’s mission to encompass review of 
regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies.” Id.; see Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–78 (2001); see also Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 
C.F.R. 134 (1982), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 97, at 649. “[E]very 
president since Ronald Reagan has relied on OIRA to scrutinize agencies’ planned regulations 
and collections of information, along with the analyses supporting them.” Susan E. Dudley, 
Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 113, 114–15 
(2011). 
 160. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1544 (9th ed. 2009).  
 161. ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–621 (2006)). 
 162. Id. § 1, at 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151). 
 163. Id. § 4, at 1066–67 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 154(a)–(d)). 
 164. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902, 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 387b) (granting the FDA authority to oversee the safety of 
foods, drugs, and cosmetics). 
 165. See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, § 202, 72 Stat. 
426, 429 (repealed 2010). 
 166. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58) (establishing the Federal Trade Commission); National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 202, 83 Stat. 852, 854 (1970) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4342) (constituting the Council on Environmental Quality within the 
Executive Office of the President).  
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agencies and the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches.167 Here 
too the APA provides a ready example. Its judicial review provisions 
serve as the foundation of the relationship between agencies and 
courts.168 This relationship finds further definition in the judicial review 
provisions embedded in a wide variety of administrative statutes. These 
provisions may permit or prohibit judicial review.169 Or they may forge 
a middle course170 by allowing only procedural review,171 allowing only 
substantive review of final rules,172 requiring the exhaustion of available 
administrative remedies as a precondition to the availability of judicial 
remedies,173 or imposing other conditions or restrictions on the scope of 
judicial review. 
Other statutory provisions govern institutional relationships by 
providing for congressional or executive oversight of administrative 
action. Statutes establishing regulatory analysis requirements often 
provide for executive oversight to ensure agency compliance.174 
Another approach is found in so-called oversight framework laws, 
which authorize independent officers to check abuses of administrative 
and executive power.175 Still other statutes facilitate congressional 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 575–78 (exploring three approaches used to understand 
the relationship between agencies and the three branches of government).  
 168. See TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1947), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/admin/
attorneygeneralsmanual.pdf.  
 169. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 805 (2012) (“No determination, finding, action, or omission 
under this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.”). 
 170. See, e.g., id. § 552b(k) (providing for limited judicial review under the Sunshine Act). 
 171. See, e.g., Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227–28 
(1980) (explaining that judicial review under NEPA is limited to providing procedural, rather 
than substantive, oversight); Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61, 81 & n.22 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a court can compel the production of an impact statement under 
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act but has no authority to review a statement’s substance).  
 172. Under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act, the agency’s decision to establish, assist, or 
terminate a negotiated rulemaking committee is not reviewable, but judicial review is available 
for the rules produced through the process. See Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
315 F. Supp. 2d 15, 30–33 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 396 F.3d 1152, 1162 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005); cf. USA Grp. Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that agency promises made during the negotiations regarding the outcome of the final rule are 
unenforceable). 
 173. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 635 
(discussing exhaustion requirements under the Federal Tort Claims Act). 
 174. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(v) (2012) (defining OMB’s oversight and guidance roles 
with respect to Privacy Act implementation); 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (2006 & Supp. V. 2011) 
(enumerating OMB responsibilities under the PRA, to be carried out through OIRA); Jeffrey S. 
Lubbers, Paperwork Redux: The (Stronger) Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 111 (1996) (examining OIRA’s expanded role in the PRA process following the 1995 
amendments to the PRA).  
 175. Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of 
Executive Power, 63 B.U. L. REV. 59, 59–60 (1983). 
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oversight of the administrative state through administrative or executive 
reporting requirements.176 The Congressional Review of Agency 
Rulemaking Act (CRA) establishes a more direct, robust form of 
congressional oversight by establishing a process through which 
Congress can review and disapprove of rules promulgated by federal 
agencies.177 The CRA has arguably not fulfilled its purpose178—to date, 
Congress has disapproved only one rule.179 The law’s central concern 
regarding the proper relationship between Congress and regulatory 
agencies, however, is a fundamentally constitutional concern that 
continues to be the subject of legislative reform efforts.180 Finally, some 
administrative statutes regulate the relationship between federal 
agencies and state and local government institutions.181 
3.  Establishing the Agency–Citizen Relationship 
A third constitutional function of administrative statutes is 
establishing the relationship between administrative agencies and the 
citizens whose lives and interests are affected by agency action. The 
APA determines the basic relationship between agencies and the public 
by requiring agencies to inform the public about their organization, 
procedures, and rules, and by permitting the public to participate in the 
rulemaking process.182 Other statutes govern how administrative 
agencies collect information from the public and how they use that 
information in day-to-day operations.183  
Statutes promoting public engagement in agency processes are 
important to this particular constitutional function. For example, 
statutory publication requirements facilitate public engagement by 
requiring agencies to provide public notice of administrative action and 
centralized access to regulations. The most important of these statutes is 
the Federal Register Act,184 which Congress enacted in response to a 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(j) (2012) (requiring agencies covered by the Sunshine Act 
to report annually to Congress); 44 U.S.C. § 3514 (2006) (requiring OMB to report annually to 
Congress regarding its PRA oversight efforts and other developments in PRA implementation). 
 177. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(d) (2012). 
 178. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 201; 
Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 95, 109–10 (1997); Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of 
Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1051, 1052–53 (1999). 
 179. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 201.  
 180. See Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011 (REINS Act), 
H.R. 10, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011).  
 181. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71 (2012). 
 182. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 168, at 9.  
 183. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–20 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 184. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1501–11 (2006). 
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Supreme Court decision involving an agency’s attempt to enforce 
regulations that turned out not to exist.185 The case revealed a 
fundamental problem in administrative governance: regulations were 
essentially unavailable, even to agency personnel tasked with enforcing 
them.186 The Act solved this problem by requiring the Government 
Printing Office (GPO) to print and distribute the Federal Register, a 
serial publication of important executive and administrative 
materials.187 The Federal Register Act further requires GPO to publish 
the Code of Federal Regulations, a special edition of the Federal 
Register presenting an orderly codification of all agency documents 
“having general applicability and legal effect.”188 The agencies’ 
publication duty—and the citizens’ concomitant right of access—has 
taken on new dimension as administrative practice has entered the 
electronic age.189 
Open government statutes similarly shape the agency–citizen 
relationship. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) imposes 
extensive open records requirements on agencies,190 while the Privacy 
Act protects individually identifiable, personal information maintained 
by the agency in a “system of records.”191 This latter law requires 
agencies to give individual citizens their own records192 but forbids 
broader dissemination of protected information, except to the extent 
required by FOIA.193 The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)194 
facilitates a different kind of openness. Enacted out of “concern about 
the influence of private advisory groups upon administrative 
activities,”195 the law limits agency use of advisory committees and 
requires such committees to have a clear purpose, balanced 
membership, and open meetings.196 The Government in the Sunshine 
Act similarly opens some agencies’ deliberative processes to public 
scrutiny197 by requiring agencies “headed by a collegial body” to hold 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). 
 186. See Erwin N. Griswold, Government in Ignorance of the Law—A Plea for Better 
Publication of Executive Legislation, 48 HARV. L. REV. 198, 204–05 (1934) (“[O]fficers of the 
government itself frequently do not know the applicable regulations.”); H.R. REP. NO. 74-280, at 
2 (1935) (voicing the concern that rules and regulations published by agencies are difficult to 
find). 
 187. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 1503–05.  
 188. See 44 U.S.C. § 1510. 
 189. See 40 U.S.C. § 305; 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501, 3601–06. 
 190. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 449. 
 191. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
 192. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 448. 
 193. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 1074. 
 194. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2012).  
 195. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 517. 
 196. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 550. 
 197. See RICHARD K. BERG ET AL., AN INTERPRETIVE GUIDE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN THE 
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“every portion of every meeting . . . open to public observation.”198 
Finally, the Ethics in Government Act of 1978199 seeks to reveal and 
reduce conflicts of interest by requiring federal employees to make 
financial disclosures and decline certain kinds of outside income and 
employment.200  
Still other statutes establish the agency–citizen relationship by 
making agencies more accountable to individual citizens. Perhaps the 
most prominent such statute is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 
which waives sovereign immunity for certain kinds of actions against 
the federal government and allows citizens to sue the government for 
injury, death, or loss of property caused by the negligent or wrongful 
acts or omissions of federal employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.201 Various other statutes follow the FTCA’s lead by 
affording administrative or judicial remedies for harms caused by the 
government.202 The Contract Disputes Act of 1978203 creates consistent, 
fair, and efficient mechanisms for resolving government contract 
disputes,204 while the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
(ADRA)205 authorizes federal agencies to use a wide array of voluntary 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods to more effectively and 
efficiently resolve routine disputes in administrative programs.206 
Finally, the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)207 is a fee-shifting 
                                                                                                                     
SUNSHINE ACT 67 (2d ed. 2005) (“In contrast with the FOIA, which protects an agency’s 
predecisional or deliberative processes, the Sunshine Act is specifically designed to open those 
processes to public observation.”).  
 198. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)–(b) (2012).  
 199. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified at 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 101–11). 
 200. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 21, at 521; see Thomas D. Morgan, 
Appropriate Limits on Participation by a Former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency, 
1980 DUKE L.J. 1, 18–21 (discussing the legislative history of the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978). 
 201. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2012). See generally LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. 
LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES 
(2012). 
 202. FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 636 (noting 
that there are “more than 40 ‘meritorious claims’ and other ancillary statutes” affording a 
remedy for losses due to government action); see George A. Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at 
the Agency Level: The FTCA Administrative Process, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 519 (1985) 
(“[T]he FTCA is foremost among existing statutory vehicles for the disposition of tort and tort-
like claims against the government.”). 
 203. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601–13 (2006). 
 204. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 441–42. 
 205. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2012). 
 206. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 399–400 
(listing various alternative dispute resolution methods); see also 5 U.S.C. § 571(2) (defining 
“administrative programs”); id. § 571(3) (defining “alternative means of dispute resolution”); id. 
§ 571(8) (defining “issue in controversy”). 
 207. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006). 
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statute that authorizes the payment of fees and costs to individuals who 
prevail in certain kinds of adversarial administrative adjudications and 
civil cases against administrative agencies.208 Particularly when 
considered in the aggregate, these various statutes profoundly affect the 
agency–citizen relationship. 
4.  Protecting Common Values 
A final constitutional function evident in administrative statutes is 
the protection and promotion of important, commonly held values.209 
Although “administrative law is rarely ascribed symbolic resonance,”210 
a closer look reveals that it extends to the administrative context many 
of “the general principles under which the country is governed.”211 In 
broadest terms, administrative law gives effect to the nation’s 
commonly held views regarding the proper role of government. It 
promotes democratic values, including public participation and political 
accountability. It even incorporates the written Constitution’s 
fundamental structural principles, including the separation of functions 
and federalism.212 
Administrative statutes perform this constitutional function by 
requiring agencies to give special consideration and (if possible) 
accommodation to vulnerable groups or important values that may be 
affected by agency action. For example, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)213 uses an “impact statement” approach to make 
agencies consider the environmental effects of regulations via an open, 
public process.214 The Regulatory Flexibility Act215 uses a similar 
process to require agencies in notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
consider the special needs of small entities that may be subject to a 
proposed rule.216 Another example is FOIA, which fosters democratic 
values and political accountability in the administrative state, as was the 
intention of those who urged its passage and expansion.217 The 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 509–10. 
 209. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 510 (explaining that much administrative law is 
“‘constitutional’ in the sense of embodying basic contemporary normative commitments with 
respect to how government should operate”). 
 210. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 123. 
 211. Raz, supra note 55, at 153. 
 212. See infra Parts III–IV. 
 213. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47 (2006). 
 214. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 154, at 851–52. 
 215. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–12 (2012).  
 216. Id. § 609(a). 
 217. See Elias Clark, Holding Government Accountable: The Amended Freedom of 
Information Act, 84 YALE L.J. 741, 742–43 (1975) (“[T]he Freedom of Information Act lets the 
citizen strip away the secrecy that surrounds the lawmaking process and discover who is making 
the law, for what purposes, to affect whom.”); Ralph Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act 
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enumerated exemptions to FOIA balance the value of transparency 
against other important public values.218 These and other administrative 
statutes perform an important constitutional function by incorporating 
core social and political values into the administrative context. 
Perhaps the most important value that administrative law protects is 
a commitment to constitutionalism. “[C]onstitutionalism has one 
essential quality: it is a legal limitation on government; it is the 
antithesis of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the 
government of will instead of law.”219 This principle encompasses “the 
idea that constitutions create power”220 and that governments therefore 
cannot exert power without constitutional authorization. As discussed in 
greater detail below, one of administrative law’s most stable and 
enduring principles holds that agencies may exercise only the authority 
granted to them.221 A related aspect of constitutionalism is “the 
requirement that polities identify specific mechanisms that will 
successfully limit the power of the sovereign.”222 Administrative law 
matches up here, too; it is rife with requirements designed to control and 
limit federal regulation, both procedurally and substantively.223 Indeed, 
much judicial review of agency action under the APA is aimed at 
ensuring that agencies do not exercise government authority in an 
arbitrary and capricious fashion.224  
B.  The Federal Common Law Component 
Other components of the administrative state’s unwritten 
constitution are found in federal common law. The common law is a 
traditional feature of the constitutional landscape in nations governed by 
an unwritten constitution. Indeed, “Dicey’s laws of the constitution [of 
Britain] also clearly include judgments in the common law that 
                                                                                                                     
and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970) (noting that FOIA was passed with the 
notion that an individual has the right of access to government information unless otherwise 
justified by the government). See generally HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO KNOW: 
LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS (1953) (surveying the existing laws, case 
law, and regulations on the state, federal, and administrative agencies and urging the 
government to improve access to information); Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (1967) (exploring the intricacies of FOIA). 
 218. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (exempting “personnel and medical files and similar 
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy”). 
 219. MCILWAIN, supra note 81, at 20–21.  
 220. BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 21. 
 221. See infra Section II.B. 
 222. BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 21. 
 223. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 121 (“Administrative law concerns the control of 
regulatory institutions.”). 
 224. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (giving different standards of review for agency action); see also 
discussion infra Part III.B. 
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influence the exercise of public power.”225 It has long been observed 
“that American administrative law is mostly judge-made.”226 But the 
phenomenon is controversial.227 And it can be difficult to discern which 
judicial decisions or doctrines are properly defined as “common law,” in 
part because common law decisions are often nominally grounded in a 
provision of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the APA. 
Nonetheless, some important administrative law doctrines are readily 
identifiable as common law. A prime example is the Chevron 
doctrine.228 Such common law doctrines provide crucial components of 
the administrative state’s unwritten constitution. They define the basic 
political authority of federal agencies, determine the respective roles of 
the various branches of government in crafting federal regulatory 
policy, and regulate the relationship between administrative agencies 
and citizens. 
In this context, “common law” refers to the “law that courts have 
created without interpreting a constitutional or statutory provision.”229 
Under this definition, not all judge-made administrative law is 
administrative common law. Rather, judge-made administrative law 
may take the form of constitutional interpretation, statutory 
interpretation, or common law.230 But these categories are more distinct 
in theory than in practice. Most cases involve some combination of the 
three, and not necessarily in easily identifiable proportions.  
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. 
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.231 provides an 
illustrative example. The Court begins with Section 706(2)(A) of the 
APA, which empowers courts to set aside “arbitrary” or “capricious” 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Palmer, supra note 65, at 608. 
 226. Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 
1980 UTAH L. REV. 3, 3; Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 120; cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-
Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 277–78 (1986) (“Judge-
made doctrines primarily sought to enable regulated entities to fend off unlawful government 
action . . . .”). 
 227. See Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24–26 (2011) (criticizing the APA’s standard of review system); John F. 
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 189–90, 192 
(1998) (discussing the different views surrounding the Chevron doctrine). Section IV.A 
discusses the controversy in greater detail. 
 228. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984). 
 229. Davis, supra note 226, at 3. Professor Davis further defines “administrative common 
law” as “either common law created by courts about the administrative process, or common law 
created by agencies through adjudication.” Id. Consistent with other recent scholarship on this 
issue, this Article examines only the former. See, e.g., Beermann, supra note 227, at 3. 
 230. Davis, supra note 226, at 4. 
 231. 463 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1983). 
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agency action.232 While ostensibly engaged in statutory interpretation, 
however, the Court establishes a standard of “hard look” review,233 
under which courts evaluate whether an agency has “examine[d] the 
relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action” 
that does not consider inappropriate factors, exclude “an important 
aspect of the problem,” or “run[] counter to the evidence before the 
agency.”234 The State Farm standard thus “represents a significant 
judicial elaboration of” the statutory text.235 At some point in the 
analysis, the Court moves quietly from statutory interpretation to the 
development of common law. But the move is implicit, and the 
boundary between the two modes of judicial decision making is fuzzy. 
It is difficult to distinguish administrative common law—especially 
that with constitutional significance—from judicial decisions involving 
constitutional or statutory interpretation. One reason for the difficulty is 
that the very existence of federal common law is controversial. “A truly 
basic fact about the common law is that judges who create new law 
customarily purport not to.”236 The literature, however, increasingly 
embraces the validity of administrative common law,237 in some cases 
urging courts to be more forthright about what they are doing when they 
make federal common law in the administrative context.238 A second 
reason for the difficulty involves distinguishing the constitutional 
aspects from the ordinary aspects of administrative common law. Some 
administrative common law relates to the substance of federal 
regulation and has little constitutional functionality. Constitutional and 
nonconstitutional issues are often intertwined, making it difficult to tell 
where the ordinary common law rule ends and the constitutional rule 
begins.239 In addition, judicial reticence toward administrative common 
law generally manifests more specifically in a reluctance to 
acknowledge “the constitutional concerns that animate” the resulting 
rules.240 
Despite these difficulties, contemporary examples of the common 
                                                                                                                     
 232. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 233. Metzger, supra note 13, at 1299. 
 234. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. 
 235. Metzger, supra note 13, at 1299. 
 236. Davis, supra note 226, at 5; accord Metzger, supra note 13, at 1356 (“[C]ourts rarely 
acknowledge the judicially created basis of administrative law doctrines or the constitutional 
concerns that animate them.”); Beermann, supra note 227, at 2 (acknowledging that courts have 
“been reluctant to be open about their use of common law in the administrative law arena”). 
 237. See Beermann, supra note 227, at 3.  
 238. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1356 (noting that “the lack of transparency poses [a] 
real legitimacy challenge for administrative common law”); id. at 1355–70 (discussing the issue 
at length). 
 239. For a more detailed discussion about the constitutional issues that surround 
administrative law, see supra Part I.  
 240. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1356. 
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law components of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution 
abound. Many such examples are found among the standards governing 
judicial review of agency action (Chevron, Skidmore, hard-look, de 
novo, etc.). Perhaps the best of these is the Chevron doctrine, which 
establishes a two-step inquiry to guide judicial review of an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute the agency is charged with implementing.241 
At Chevron step one, the court asks whether the statutory provision at 
issue is unambiguous. If it is, that ends the matter. The agency must 
adhere to Congress’s unambiguous statutory commands. But if, as is 
more often the case, the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous, the 
court proceeds to step two, determining whether the agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable.242 Chevron is functionally constitutional: at 
its core, it is about the respective roles of the Legislature, the Judiciary, 
and the administrative state in interpreting the law and establishing 
regulatory policy. Indeed, the Court explicitly justified its decision 
based on these constitutional considerations.243 It did not even cite the 
APA.244 For these reasons, Chevron has consistently been identified as a 
“quintessential common law creation.”245  
Federal common law is essential in defining the constitutional 
function of administrative agencies. For example, judicial review has 
been credited with transforming the informal rulemaking process into 
something much more complex than contemplated when the APA was 
adopted. “When Congress adopted the [APA], the notice and comment 
requirement for rulemaking was viewed as a variant on the legislative 
process that would allow agencies to adopt and amend rules quickly in 
response to changing circumstances.”246 Beginning with the statutory 
expansion of judicial review in the 1970s, however, judicial review 
transformed “the notice and comment process into one requiring 
extensive documentation of the information on which the agency relies 
and detailed explanation of the choices the agency made in deciding to 
adopt a rule.”247 Federal common law doctrines can be credited with 
much of this transformation. As Part III discusses, administrative 
common law decisions are also a primary vehicle by which fundamental 
constitutional principles such as the separation of powers and the rule of 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43. 
 242. See id. 
 243. See id. at 865–66; Metzger, supra note 13, at 1302. 
 244. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the [APA], 
which it did not even bother to cite.”). 
 245. Beermann, supra note 227, at 21; see also, e.g., Metzger, supra note 13, at 1301 
(“Chevron analysis represents judicially created administrative law.”). 
 246. Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative Rulemaking, 27 
FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 533, 533 (2000) (citing Rabin, supra note 24, at 1265). 
 247. Id. at 533. 
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law are transported into the administrative context.248  
C.  Executive Policy and Administrative Constitutionalism 
Executive orders and related policy documents provide additional 
components of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution. These 
legal instruments, which typically apply only to Executive Branch 
agencies, often serve the same constitutional functions as the statutes 
and federal common law doctrines examined above. Because executive 
orders and related policy documents are created and controlled 
exclusively by the Executive, however, they may be more vulnerable to 
changing political currents than statutes such as the APA. For this 
reason, at least in theory, these documents may be among the least 
stable components of the administrative constitution. In practice, 
however, a number of crucial executive policies have endured across 
both Republican and Democratic administrations.  
Two examples suffice to demonstrate that executive directives are 
properly considered part of the unwritten administrative constitution. 
Perhaps the best example is Executive Order 12,866, which governs 
Executive Branch review of administrative action.249 It is a crucial 
instrument regulating executive–administrative relations. Executive 
Order 12,866 is the governing manifestation of an executive review 
regime that has proven durable across several administrations and has in 
certain respects been internalized and implicitly sanctioned by 
Congress.250 Another example is Executive Order 13,132, which directs 
agencies to consult with state and local governments when considering 
proposed rules that may have preemptive effect.251 This instrument 
ensures that agencies consider how regulations may affect federalism.252 
Other executive policy directives have different constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 248. See infra Part III. 
 249. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 97, at 638 (“With this Executive order, the 
Federal Government begins a program to reform and make more efficient the regulatory 
process.”). 
 250. Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA’s Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 113, 114–15 (2011) (noting the Executive Order’s durability). Executive review 
began with the Reagan Administration’s issuance of Executive Order 12,291. When Congress 
enacted the Congressional Review Act in 1996, it imported Executive Order 12,291’s definition 
of “major rule” to define the rules that administrative agencies must submit to. 
 251. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000). 
 252. Cf. Agency Procedures for Considering Preemption of State Law, 76 Fed. Reg. 81 
(Jan. 3, 2011) (recommending how agencies can improve procedures for considering state 
interests in potentially preemptive rulemakings). See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside 
Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012) (evaluating the internal procedures that 
agencies use to ensure compliance with executive orders that require consideration of state 
interests in potentially preemptive rulemakings). 
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implications.253 
III.  SUBSTANTIVE VALUES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATION 
As previously discussed, administrative law performs constitutional 
functions, but this raises two further questions: what substantive values 
guide the performance of these constitutional functions; and what are 
the implications of acknowledging the constitutional character of 
administrative law? The key substantive values of the administrative 
state’s unwritten constitution include the separation of powers, rule of 
law, and other (often conflicting) subsidiary values. Examining how 
these substantive values manifest in administrative law reveals several 
generalized political obligations that flow from administrative law’s 
constitutional character.  
A.  Separation of Powers and Sources of Substantive Values 
The principle most commonly known as “separation of powers,” an 
important concept of the written Constitution,254 also finds expression in 
administrative law.255 The term encompasses three distinct but related 
approaches to resolving disputes regarding the proper roles of and 
relationship among the branches of government. The eponymous first 
approach characterizes each branch according to the kind of work it 
does (legislating, enforcing, adjudicating) and, in order to provide 
structural protection against tyranny, allocates each type of work to the 
single, appropriate branch.256 In contrast, the “checks and balances” 
approach rejects an absolute separation of power among the branches of 
government and focuses instead on “whether the relationship of each of 
the three named actors of the Constitution to the exercise of those 
                                                                                                                     
 253. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 145, at 342 (examining a White House memo that 
“tie[d] together transparency, participation, and collaboration,” and “set policy goals for these 
three dimensions of the relationship between government and the governed”). 
 254. E.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“The Constitution sought to divide the 
delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, 
Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch of government would 
confine itself to its assigned responsibility.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative 
powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of 
a Senate and House of Representatives.”); id. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America.”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 255. Strauss, supra note 4, at 577. See generally BREYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 37–144 
(thoroughly examining the constitutional position of administrative agencies). There are myriad 
examples of separation of powers principles in administrative law. This section identifies only 
as many examples as are necessary for its analysis. 
 256. Strauss, supra note 4, at 577; see also, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) 
(examining how the separation of powers provides structural protection against tyranny). 
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powers is such as to promise a continuation of their effective 
independence and interdependence.”257 The third approach, “separation 
of functions,” uses procedural protections to ensure fairness in 
individual proceedings, rather than using structural arrangements to 
prevent tyranny on a more general level.258 This approach permits 
administrative agencies to do the work of all three branches, “albeit in a 
web of other controls,” including “judicial review and legislative and 
executive oversight.”259 
In the administrative context, principles of the separation of powers 
manifest in several ways, the first of which defines the relationships 
among the three primary branches of government—Executive, 
Legislative, and Judicial—in controlling the administrative apparatus. 
For example, separation of powers principles derived from the written 
Constitution determine the respective authority of Congress and the 
President regarding the removal of high-ranking administrative 
officials.260 Another example is found in the standards governing 
judicial review. These standards effectively allocate authority over 
administrative policy making among the three branches of 
government.261 Judicial review provides an essential check on 
administrative power.262 Doctrines governing the exercise of this check 
also determine the respective roles of agencies, courts, and Congress. 
For example, Chevron deference is not based solely on agency 
expertise263 but is also grounded in the principle that the political 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Strauss, supra note 4, at 578. 
 258. Id. at 577.  
 259. Id. 
 260. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3147 (2010) (holding that “multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting 
of the executive power in the President”); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
629 (1935) (upholding Congress’s authority to limit the President’s ability to remove governing 
members of independent agencies); cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695–97 (1988) 
(upholding congressional restrictions on the power of principal executive officers to remove 
their subordinates); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (same). See generally 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 106, 176 (1926) (holding that the President does not have 
exclusive power to remove an officer who was appointed with the advice and consent of the 
Senate). 
 261. See generally Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in 
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989) (examining the structural implications 
of Chevron for allocating authority among the Legislature, the courts, and agencies). 
 262. E.g., LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320–53 (1965) 
(examining the right to judicial review); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative 
State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983) (discussing the judicial review of administrative actions). 
 263. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 
(1984) (“In these cases the Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable 
accommodation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to deference: the regulatory 
scheme is technical and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned 
fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting policies.”); see also Pub. Citizen v. 
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branches of government, rather than the Judiciary, should make policy 
choices.264 This rule is evident in the structure of the two-step inquiry 
required by Chevron, which requires courts to defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of the law only if the statute does not 
unambiguously require a particular course of action.265 As the D.C. 
Circuit succinctly explained, “[t]he reason undergirding Chevron’s Step 
One is to be found in democratic theory; judicial deference to agencies 
is, upon reflection, but one form of obedience to the will of the 
legislative body.”266 
A second manifestation of the separation of powers in the 
administrative context involves the relationship between administrative 
agencies and each of the other branches of government. One example of 
this function is the nondelegation doctrine, which establishes the 
conditions under which Congress may constitutionally delegate its 
legislative authority to others, including administrative agencies.267 
Similarly, judicial review doctrines restrict the Judiciary’s ability to 
intrude upon an agency’s delegated authority. For example, when 
reviewing “a determination or judgment which an administrative agency 
alone is authorized to make,” a court must “judge the propriety of 
[agency] action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”268 To do 
                                                                                                                     
Burke, 843 F.2d 1473, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that Chevron deference is warranted 
not only because of agency expertise but “also because the Executive Branch, populated by 
political appointees, is thought to have greater legitimacy than the non-political Judiciary in 
resolving statutory ambiguities, in light of policy concerns, when congressional intent is 
unclear”); Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 836 F.2d 599, 609 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988) (“Chevron’s rationale for deference is based on more than agency expertise.”). 
 264. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 
U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (“If the statute is clear and unambiguous ‘that is the end of the matter, for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.’” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43)). 
 265. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
 266. Ass’n of Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 267. Early cases rigidly held that the written Constitution prevented Congress from 
delegating its legislative authority to others. E.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) 
(recognizing that “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President”); Shankland v. 
Mayor of Wash., 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 395 (1831) (“[T]he general rule of law is, that a delegated 
authority cannot be delegated.”). The possibility of delegation was later admitted, provided it 
was accompanied by an intelligible principle governing the exercise of the delegated authority. 
See ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry., 167 U.S. 479, 505 (1897) (stating that 
Congress has previously delegated power to the agency and that if Congress intended to 
delegate such power to the ICC, it would have used “clear and direct” language); Pan. Ref. Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 429–30 (1935) (holding that delegation of legislative power to an agency 
is valid if Congress lays out an “intelligible principle”). This formulation of the nondelegation 
doctrine persists to this day, but the Supreme Court has “found the requisite ‘intelligible 
principle’ lacking in only two statutes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 
(2001).  
 268. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
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otherwise “would propel the court into the domain which Congress has 
set aside exclusively for the administrative agency.”269 Yet another 
example of this manifestation of the separation of powers is Executive 
Order 12,866, which governs executive review of regulatory action.270  
A third and final manifestation of the separation of powers in 
administrative law shapes the internal operation of agencies in the 
exercise of their delegated regulatory authority. In this context, it is 
more accurate to speak of the “separation of functions” because 
agencies use all three governmental functions (legislative, executive, 
and judicial) to fulfill their statutory mandates.271 In exchange for this 
consolidation of functions, agencies are subjected to procedural 
requirements designed to protect the public against the abuse of 
administrative power.272 The precise contours of this tradeoff vary 
depending upon whether the agency is engaged in rulemaking or 
adjudication.273 This procedural dichotomy is grounded in the written 
Constitution,274 case law,275 and statutes, most notably the APA.276 
                                                                                                                     
 269. Id.  
 270. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 97; cf. Kagan, supra note 159 (examining 
how Presidents review and control regulatory policy). 
 271. E.g., Berle, supra note 1, at 440, 442–43 (arguing that an administrative body “may, 
and often does, exercise all three of the usual trinity of powers”); see also Benjamin W. Mintz, 
Administrative Separation of Functions: OSHA and the NLRB, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 877 (1998) 
(examining the separation of functions within two particular agencies). 
 272. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
 273. See BREYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 641. 
 274. Courts have consistently recognized that the Constitution generally imposes no 
procedural requirements on the exercise of legislative authority by Congress or by 
administrative agencies. See, e.g., Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 291 
(1984) (holding that there is no special constitutional protection granted by the public’s “interest 
in a government audience for their policy views”); Interport Pilots Agency v. Sammis, 14 F.3d 
133, 142 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Official action that is legislative in nature is not subject to the notice 
and hearing requirements of the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.”); McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 
499, 504 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that where a legislation “affects a general class of people, the 
legislative process provides all the process that is due”); Coniston Corp. v. Vill. of Hoffman 
Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 468–69 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[I]f a state legislature wishes to reserve to itself 
the type of decision that in other systems might be given to the executive or judicial branches, it 
can do so without violating the federal Constitution.”). The Constitution does, however, impose 
some procedural requirements on an agency’s exercise of adjudicative power. See Londoner v. 
Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908) (holding that in adjudicative matters, there must be notice and 
an opportunity to be heard). 
 275. The Supreme Court has, however, restricted courts from imposing procedures beyond 
those required by the Constitution, the APA, or other statutes. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). 
 276. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), (7) (2012) (defining “rule making” and “adjudication”). 
Compare id. § 553 (establishing the procedural requirements for agency rulemaking), with id. 
§ 554 (establishing the procedural requirements for agency adjudication). Agencies may also be 
subject to heightened procedural requirements established in an organic statute. See BREYER ET 
AL., supra note 2, at 641.  
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This discussion reveals the importance of the administrative state’s 
unwritten constitution for establishing the fundamental substantive 
values governing the exercise of government power through the 
administrative apparatus. Questions regarding the allocation of authority 
among the primary three branches of government—Congress, the 
Executive, and the Judiciary—with respect to administrative 
governance may sometimes be resolved by reference to the written 
Constitution.277 But that document “leaves undiscussed what might be 
the necessary and permissible relationships of each of these three 
constitutional bodies to the agency making the rule.”278 It similarly 
leaves undiscussed the separation of functions within administrative 
agencies.279 In these areas, the administrative state’s unwritten 
constitution—as found in statutes, federal common law, and executive 
directives—must furnish the governing separation of powers principles. 
The unwritten constitution must also provide other substantive values of 
administrative governance. 
An essential first implication of this Article’s theory emerges here: 
the many actors in the system who contribute to the development of the 
components of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution must 
imbue those components with substantive value.280 To fulfill this 
obligation, these actors must acknowledge and understand the 
constitutional implications of their work, whether it consists of drafting 
statutes, crafting common law, or composing executive directives. 
Further nuances of this central obligation will emerge below, as this 
Article continues to examine the implications of a constitutional theory 
of administrative law through the lens of the substantive values and 
evolutionary characteristics of the administrative state’s unwritten 
constitution. 
                                                                                                                     
 277. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 278. Strauss, supra note 4, at 577; see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994) (discussing the debate 
surrounding a constitutionally established plenary power for the President to control 
administration of the law); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power 
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (discussing the constitutional understanding of 
Congress and the President’s roles in the administration of laws). 
 279. As previously discussed, the written Constitution may impose some obligations on 
agencies in the exercise of their delegated authority. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
 280. Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of 
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332 (2008) (examining how the rise of administrative law and 
judicial review has affected the exercise of mercy in the criminal justice system); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, “Rights” in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1129 (1983) 
(explaining the “dependence of the judiciary on the legislative and administrative branches of 
government for the very conception of law that animates judicial judgment”). 
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B.  The Rule of Law and the Protection of Substantive Values 
Further implications of this Article’s theory can be gleaned by 
examining a second core substantive value of the administrative 
constitution, a value inextricably linked to the separation of powers: the 
rule of law.281 In its most succinct formulation, the rule of law demands 
“a government of laws and not of men.”282 The rule of law requires the 
exercise of governmental authority to be grounded in law,283 subjects 
government officials to the same legal requirements applicable to 
citizens,284 and demands evenhandedness and impartiality of 
government officials.285 The rule of law is a fundamental concept 
underlying the written Constitution286 because it “permits society to 
presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in 
the proclivities of individuals.”287 Courts have found the rule of law 
                                                                                                                     
 281. E.g., BREYER ET AL., supra note 2, at 37 (explaining that the separation of powers “is 
part and parcel of the ideal of the rule of law”); see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose behind the separation of powers 
doctrine was “to save the people from autocracy”); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the 
Rule of Law and the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 304 (1989) 
(suggesting that under the rule of law, separation of powers has the purpose of “neutraliz[ing] 
conflicts of interest inherent in the governmental process”). 
 282. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see JOHN ADAMS, 
Novanglus; or, a History of the Dispute with America, from Its Origin, in 1754, to the Present 
Time (pt. 7), in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 99, 106 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851) (“If 
Aristotle, Livy, and Harrington knew what a republic was, the British constitution is much more 
like a republic than an empire. They define a republic to be a government of laws, and not of 
men.”). 
 283. E.g., Richard E. Levy, The Tie That Binds: Some Thoughts About the Rule of Law, 
Law and Economics, Collective Action Theory, Reciprocity, and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle, 56 KAN. L. REV. 899, 900 (2008) (explaining that the rule of law “means that 
governmental authority must have a basis in law and that the actions of government and 
government officials are subject to the law and constrained by it”). 
 284. See, e.g., Harry W. Jones, The Common Law in the United States: English Themes and 
American Variations, in POLITICAL SEPARATION AND LEGAL CONTINUITY 91, 129 (Harry W. 
Jones ed., 1976) (“[T]he ‘rule’ or ‘supremacy’ of law means simply that all members of society, 
government officials as well as private persons, are equally responsible to the law 
and . . . ‘equally amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals.’”). 
 285. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“Central . . . to the idea of the 
rule of law . . . is the principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial 
terms to all who seek its assistance.”). 
 286. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 921 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) 
(stating that the constitutional idea is the rule of law); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own 
Constitution requires such continuity over time . . . .”). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997) 
(examining attempts to define the rule of law and explaining four types of rule-of-law ideals). 
 287. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986); cf. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 
176 (1986) (“[T]hose who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve 
as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set 
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equally foundational in administrative law.288 
In some cases, the rule of law manifests in administrative law as a 
result of written constitutional norms. For example, the written 
Constitution’s prohibition on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws289 
compels a distinction between agency rulemaking and agency 
adjudication.290 As discussed in greater detail above, this distinction has 
important consequences for agency procedures and the protection of 
individual rights.291 
Unwritten rule of law principles are also often invoked in 
administrative law, particularly in the context of judicial review. Courts 
recognize that the axiomatic principle “that a federal agency does not 
have the power to act unless Congress, by statute, has empowered it to 
do so”292 flows from scrupulous observance of the rule of law.293 
Judicial review doctrines are rooted in this most basic principle and are 
predicated, at least in part, on the assumption that agencies observe the 
rule of law in promulgating legally binding regulations.294 Congress has 
enshrined such rule-of-law principles in the APA. For example, “[t]he 
presumption of reviewability under the APA is based on a set of 
considerations, loosely captured in the notion of the rule of law, that 
relate to the perceived need to constrain the exercise of discretionary 
power by administrative agencies.”295 
  
                                                                                                                     
aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”). 
 288. Maximum Serv. Telecasters v. FCC, 853 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“The 
fundamental principle in our polity, even in the modern administrative state, is not deference, 
but the rule of law.”). 
 289. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 290. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
 291. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. 
 292. Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 596, 621 (D.C. 
Cir. 1992) (citing Rubin, supra note 20, at 402); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate 
legislative regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no power to 
act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”). 
 293. See, e.g., S. Union Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 840 F.2d 964, 972 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Like the common law, the administrative state is very much a common-sense 
affair, shaped by experience and consistent with the rule of law as laid down by Congress.”). 
 294. E.g., Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 349 (Brown, J., 
dissenting in part) (“[A]dministrative review assumes a structured, rule-of-law infused 
process.”); see also Transohio, 967 F.2d at 621 (citing WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 66 (8th ed. 1987)) (“Agency actions beyond delegated authority are 
‘ultra vires,’ and courts must invalidate them.”); id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706(2)(C)) 
(defining the scope of “judicial review for agency actions ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations’”). 
 295. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 655 (1985). 
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Rule-of-law considerations have implications for agencies’ internal 
operations, as well as courts’ corresponding duties on judicial review. 
For example, “the Rule of Law requires that agencies apply the same 
basic standard of conduct to all parties appearing before them.”296 
Congress has codified this requirement of nonarbitrary agency action in 
the APA’s judicial review provisions.297 As the D.C. Circuit eloquently 
explained, another command grounded in the rule of law is that 
agencies provide a reasoned explanation when they change course from 
a previously established policy: 
Lodged deep within the bureaucratic heart of administrative 
procedure . . . is the . . . essential proposition that, when an 
agency decides to reverse its course, it must provide an 
opinion or analysis indicating that the standard is being 
changed and not ignored, and assuring that it is faithful and 
not indifferent to the rule of law.298 
This requirement in turn has implications for judicial responsibilities in 
reviewing agency action, for when an agency changes course, a court 
reviewing the action must “understand the basis of the agency’s action” 
and “judge the consistency of that action with the agency’s mandate.”299 
The reasoned explanation requirement does not produce a very strong 
norm of consistency because the courts apply it predominately as a 
procedural requirement, giving substantial deference to the agency’s 
determination that the offered explanation substantively warrants the policy 
shift.300 However modest its demands, the requirement nonetheless has a 
                                                                                                                     
 296. Teamsters Local Union 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1392 (1976); see also Local 
777, Democratic Union Org. Comm. v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 881 n.51 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(explaining “the axiom of administrative law that agencies are only entitled to deference when 
they act according to the rule of law, in an equitable and non-arbitrary fashion”). 
 297. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (empowering courts to set aside agency action that is 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
 298. CBS v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1971); e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (holding that an agency rescinding its 
rule must provide a reasoned analysis for the change in course); Greater Bos. Television Corp. 
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that an agency must “articulate with 
reasonable clarity its reasons for [a] decision”). 
 299. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973); 
Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 800 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see 
NAACP v. FCC, 682 F.2d 993, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[W]here policy has been altered, the 
court should be satisfied both that the agency was aware it was changing its views and has 
articulated permissible reasons for that change, and also that the new position is consistent with 
the law.”). 
 300. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) (“In such 
cases it is not that further justification is demanded by the mere fact of the policy change; but 
that a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or 
were engendered by the prior policy.”). 
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constitutional character and purpose, for “[j]udicial vigilance to enforce 
the Rule of Law in the administrative process is particularly called upon 
where . . . the area under consideration is one wherein the [agency’s] 
policies are in flux.”301  
There is a correlation between these decisions and the consequences 
of viewing administrative law through the lens of constitutional theory. 
Rule-of-law principles operate in administrative law to balance the 
natural, beneficial evolution of administrative norms and policy against 
the need for stability and neutrality in the creation and enforcement of 
legally binding rules. In like fashion, the administrative constitution’s 
unwritten nature both flows from and enables its incremental evolution 
in response to changing national needs.302 This inherent flexibility of the 
administrative constitution has facilitated the modern administrative 
state’s operation.303 But it must be balanced with stability—an essential 
feature of constitutionalism and a requirement of the rule of law.304  
The affinity between constitutionalism and the rule of law reveals a 
second implication of this Article’s theory: those responsible for 
shaping the substantive values of the administrative state’s unwritten 
constitution must protect and promote the stability of those values even 
as the unwritten constitution evolves. This calls upon the Legislature, 
the Executive, the Judiciary, and agencies to balance the flexibility that 
arises from the administrative constitution’s unwritten character against 
the stability demanded by faithful adherence to constitutionalism and 
the rule of law. This obligation is the source of administrative law’s 
prudential entrenchment.305 
C.  Subsidiary Values and Coping with Complexity 
Beyond the foundational values of the separation of powers and the 
rule of law, administrative law also vindicates a variety of subsidiary 
values. For example, administrative law has historically valued the 
elevation of technical expertise over political considerations.306 This 
                                                                                                                     
 301. Greater Bos. Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
 302. See supra notes 72–77, 124–26, and accompanying text. 
 303. For example, in limiting procedural requirements for the administrative assessment of 
a generally applicable tax, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]here must be a limit to 
individual argument in such matters if government is to go on.” Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
 304. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very 
concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time 
that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”). 
 305. See supra text accompanying note 133. 
 306. See, e.g., Berle, supra note 1, at 439–40; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 
1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Through this policy of deference, agencies, not courts, retain 
control over which permissible reading of the regulations they will enforce. Appropriately so, 
since it is the agencies, not the courts, that have the technical expertise and political authority to 
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approach may reflect the Progressive belief “that government could be 
separated into a realm of value-laden politics and a realm of 
administrative expertise based on scientific principles.”307 
Administrative law also “seeks to guide the use of government authority 
in ways that promote values such as democracy, fairness, effectiveness, 
and efficiency.”308 And, as discussed previously, various statutes require 
administrative agencies to consider the needs of vulnerable populations 
and respect certain fundamental values.309 
These values are often in tension, if not outright conflict, with one 
another.310 Experience has proven regulatory policy making to be a 
value-laden endeavor, requiring more than just technical expertise. This 
gives rise to inevitable tensions between democratic values and the 
preference for expert regulatory decisions.311 Such tension is evident in 
FACA, which promotes transparency by encumbering agencies’ ability 
to convene advisory committees capable of sharing relevant expertise 
with agency decision makers.312 The value in creating expertly crafted 
rules may similarly conflict with efforts to encourage public 
participation in the rulemaking process.313 Promoting transparency may 
conflict with facilitating collaborative governance.314 Perhaps the most 
                                                                                                                     
carry out statutory mandates.” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984))). 
 307. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 
165, 169 (1999); see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 371 (2004) (“The central 
proposition of the New Deal regulatory model was that a few well-educated, specially trained, 
and publicly appointed professionals could make the best decisions about national policies.”). 
 308. Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1111, 1114. 
 309. See supra Subsection II.A.4. 
 310. E.g., PETER CANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 410 (Paul Craig ed., 5th ed. 2011); see also 
Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 742–43 
(1976) (exploring the propensity of administrative values to conflict with one another and the 
difficulty of reconciling such conflicts). 
 311. See generally Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional 
Choices About Administrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62 (1995) (articulating a 
model showing the “trade-off between control and expertise” and how it affects the “degree of 
independence delegated to an agency”). 
 312. See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text. 
 313. See Coglianese, Kilmartin & Mendelson, supra note 47, at 928–30. Indeed, efforts to 
facilitate public participation in rulemaking may be viewed as an attempt to shift the balance 
between the political insulation necessary for expert judgments and the political accountability 
necessary to create rules genuinely responsive to public needs. See Ernest Gellhorn, Public 
Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 359–62 (1972); see also 
Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 787–88 (1984) 
(describing “the classic conflict in the administrative state between political accountability and 
the necessary complexity of regulatory decisionmaking”). 
 314. But see Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 
36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 137 (2013) (suggesting that a “collaborative approach 
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pervasive and persistent value conflict in administrative law is the 
“inherent conflict between efficiency and fairness.”315 One example of 
this conflict is the issue of whether to provide individuals with a trial-
type hearing in an administrative adjudication.316 Even if greater 
fairness and accuracy can be achieved through the provision of such 
procedures, it may be achieved at the cost of administrative 
efficiency.317 
The evolution of administrative law has been driven largely by 
continuous efforts to properly calibrate and recalibrate the balance 
between these various values.318 The unwritten nature of the 
administrative constitution is essential to this enterprise because it 
facilitates such incremental, evolutionary development. It provides 
administrative actors with the latitude to respond to changed conditions 
that might reveal a previous value judgment to be inadequate or 
undesirable. The emergence of electronic methods of communication, 
for example, has offered new opportunities to simultaneously improve 
both transparency and political accountability.319 At the same time, 
taking advantage of these opportunities required legislative action and 
posed significant new challenges for administrative actors.320  
                                                                                                                     
provides the best chance for improving public access while retaining the benefits of the well-
established federal standards policy”). 
 315. Roland M. Frye, Jr., Restricted Communications at the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 325–26 (2007) (footnote omitted); see Henry 
J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1975) (discussing the 
benefits and drawbacks of administrative hearings and notice and comment procedures); Jerry 
L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in 
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 57–
58 (1976) (arguing that a procedural structure that incorporates agency decisions and a separate 
administrative appeal process is a “necessary compromise between consistency and 
individualization”); cf. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 548, 623–24 (1969) (explaining that preoccupation with “considerations of fairness and 
equity” has caused regulatory experts to ignore “[i]ssues as or more important to the welfare of 
society—issues of economic efficiency in the broadest sense of that term”). 
 316. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 401–02 (1973). 
 317. See, e.g., Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 80-1: 
Trade Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act, in ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND REPORTS 3, 3–5, 7 (1980); Administrative Conference of the United States, 
Recommendation 79-1: Hybrid Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS 3, 7–
10 (1979). 
 318. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 145, at 302; Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory 
of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 90 (1996). 
 319. Marshall J. Breger, Government Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 423, 424–25 (1996). 
 320. See Beth Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 
433, 466–69 (2004) (explaining the E-Rulemaking Initiative and its three implementation 
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The failure to recognize the constitutional character of administrative 
law has historically prevented reformers from understanding the larger 
implications of their incremental contributions to the administrative 
state’s unwritten constitution. That is, “the everyday politics of 
regulatory reform has been conducted without much concern for 
establishing a coherent theory of administrative government.”321 The 
result is a legal regime that is fundamentally reactive and riddled with 
theoretical incoherence. This incoherence is evident upon reviewing the 
many statutes that contribute to the administrative state’s unwritten 
constitution.322 Each such statute addresses a discrete problem faced by 
agencies, typically without confronting the question of how the 
proffered solution affects the balance of key values within the 
administrative constitution as a whole.323 Over many decades, some 
values have consistently risen to the top. But without awareness of the 
overarching policies and principles of administrative constitutionalism, 
each incremental step threatens to undermine administrative law’s 
conformity to fundamental constitutional values. 
Two final, related implications of the unwritten constitution theory 
become apparent here. Acknowledging the constitutional character of 
administrative law requires constitutional actors to recognize the 
existence, complexity, and perennial tension among administrative 
law’s various subsidiary values. It also requires these actors to consider 
how each incremental change to core administrative requirements will 
affect the administrative constitution as a whole.324 In short, 
administrative law’s constitutional character obligates Congress, the 
Executive, the Judiciary, and agencies to take a holistic approach to 
reform in order to ensure that each incremental change in administrative 
law furthers the coherent evolution of the administrative state’s 
unwritten constitution.  
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REALISM 
Acknowledging the constitutional character of administrative law 
thus reveals four related, generalized political obligations to: (1) 
affirmatively shape the substantive constitutional values of the 
administrative state; (2)  protect and promote the stability of those 
                                                                                                                     
modules). 
 321. Rabin, supra note 24, at 1194. 
 322. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 145, at 304–15 (examining the origins and theory of 
each major administrative statute).  
 323. See id. 
 324. Cf. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Paul Verkuil’s Projects for the Administrative Conference of 
the U.S. 1974–1992, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2421, 2430 (“[T]he quest is to find the optimum 
balance of fairness, efficiency, and satisfaction to the participants (sometimes called 
‘acceptability’) in administrative proceedings.”). 
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values as the unwritten constitution of the administrative state evolves; 
(3)  find and maintain an appropriate balance between substantive 
values that are in perennial tension or even outright conflict with one 
another; and (4) employ a holistic approach to ensure that each step in 
the evolution of administrative law furthers the overall theoretical 
coherence of the administrative state’s unwritten constitution. By virtue 
of their respective positions within the structure of the federal 
government, however, Congress, the Executive, the Judiciary, and 
agencies are called upon to discharge these obligations in different 
ways.  
Viewing administrative law as an unwritten constitution has several 
more concrete, beneficial implications. First, the theory provides a legal 
and theoretical foundation for the controversial phenomenon of 
administrative common law. By placing that phenomenon in a broader 
institutional context, the theory shows why and how judicial lawmaking 
in the administrative context presents less of a threat to the separation of 
powers and federalism than such lawmaking presents in other contexts. 
Indeed, the theory shows that judicial participation in the creation and 
maintenance of the unwritten administrative constitution may be 
necessary to preserve the separation of powers and mitigate the 
potential constitutional harms of an administrative state subject to the 
political branches’ exclusive control. Second, embracing administrative 
law’s constitutional character clarifies Congress’s prudential obligations 
to approach administrative reform proposals with respect for the 
fundamental constitutional values protected by existing administrative 
law. Finally, the unwritten constitution theory of administrative law 
facilitates a more nuanced understanding of the realities of 
administration and reveals the opportunity to harness the power of 
conventions to encourage administrative constitutionalism. 
A.  Justifying Administrative Common Law 
Despite its centrality to administrative law, federal common law is 
generally disfavored.325 Indeed, in the 1938 case of Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,326 the Supreme Court flatly declared that “[t]here is no 
federal general common law.”327 The reality is more complicated than 
Erie suggests.328 For federal courts, particularly when sitting in diversity 
                                                                                                                     
 325. Cf. Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 585, 585 (2006) (“Despite Erie’s declaration that ‘[t]here is no federal general common 
law,’ well-established and stable pockets of federal common law persist in several areas . . . .”). 
 326. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 327. Id. at 78. 
 328. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011) (noting 
that Erie led to several federal laws addressing national concerns); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. 
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95–96 (1981) (explaining the commonly understood scope of 
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or adjudicating private rights, the rule generally remains that, “[e]xcept 
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, 
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”329 But the 
Supreme Court has recognized the legitimacy of federal common law 
rules in a few narrow enclaves, including cases that affect the United 
States’ rights and obligations, controversies between states, 
international relations, and admiralty.330 In some circumstances, the 
practice is considered legitimate because Congress has authorized the 
courts to create common law rules necessary to effectuate a federal 
statutory scheme.331 In other circumstances, the Court “has recognized a 
[judicial] responsibility, in the absence of legislation, to fashion federal 
common law in cases raising issues of uniquely federal concern.”332 
Even in cases that call for the application of federal common law rules, 
however, federal courts must draw on state law to give content to those 
rules, unless doing so will create significant conflict with federal 
policies, interests, or statutory objectives.333  
Federal common law’s disfavored status is based on a blend of 
separation of powers and federalism concerns. Independent judicial 
assumption of federal common lawmaking authority is in tension with 
the Constitution’s vesting the federal lawmaking power in Congress.334 
The tendency of federal common law to displace state law is similarly 
incompatible with both federalism335 and the traditional view of federal 
                                                                                                                     
federal common law). 
 329. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several 
states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress 
otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts 
of the United States, in cases where they apply.”); Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 325, at 586 
& n.8. 
 330. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 325, at 594; Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 
Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). The Court has also approved federal common law in more 
narrow areas related to the government contractor defense and certain federal rules of 
preclusion. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 325, at 594. 
 331. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991); Texas Indus., 451 
U.S. at 642. The existence of a federal statute does not give the courts free reign to create related 
federal common law. See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 97–98 (citations omitted). Rather, the practice is 
permitted “only when the [statutory] scheme in question evidences a distinct need for 
nationwide legal standards, or when express provisions in analogous statutory schemes embody 
congressional policy choices readily applicable to the matter at hand.” Id. at 98 (citations 
omitted). 
 332. Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95. 
 333. See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83–85 (1994) (stating that federal 
courts should adopt state law to give depth to federal common law rules, unless it 
“would . . . contradict an explicit federal statutory provision”); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 
487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988) (same). 
 334. E.g., Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95. 
 335. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (declaring that neither Congress 
nor the federal courts have the power to declare state common law applicable). 
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law as largely interstitial.336 Some further argue that federal common 
law is illegitimate because it shifts responsibility for creating the law 
from democratically accountable state or federal officials to unelected 
federal judges. These critics also express skepticism that the courts have 
sufficient institutional competence to create federal common law 
rules.337 Finally, the Supreme Court has warned against “the runaway 
tendencies of ‘federal common law’ untethered to a genuinely 
identifiable (as opposed to judicially constructed) federal policy.”338 
The lesson, it seems, is that federal common law may pose a greater 
threat to separation of powers and federalism in the absence of an 
extrinsic, overarching policy that can simultaneously cabin judicial 
lawmaking authority and provide a foundation for evaluating the 
substantive validity of federal common law rules. 
The stakes are higher when federal common law rules have 
constitutional roots. A judicial ruling mandated by the Constitution 
effectively takes on the formally entrenched status of the underlying 
constitutional provision: barring a constitutional amendment, the ruling 
binds state and federal political authorities. In contrast, because 
constitutional common law rules are designed to vindicate constitutional 
rights or principles but are not mandated by the Constitution, such rules 
are “subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress” 
through ordinary legislative means.339 The Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule340 and the Fifth Amendment’s Miranda warning 
requirements341 have been offered as two examples of constitutional 
common law rules. It is often very difficult, however, to determine 
where constitutional interpretation ends and constitutional common law 
begins.342 The Supreme Court rarely draws the line explicitly and 
sometimes even blurs it by denying Congress’s authority to deviate 
from what otherwise appears to be a common law rule.343 Thus, while 
the Supreme Court first acknowledged the authority of Congress and the 
states to devise effective alternatives to the required Miranda 
                                                                                                                     
 336. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 881, 931 (1986). 
 337. Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 325, at 614–15. 
 338. O’Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 89. 
 339. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–
3 (1975); see Metzger, supra note 3, at 481 (noting that in several contexts involving 
constitutional common law rules, “the Court [has] expressly acknowledged that its constitutional 
rulings were to some extent revisable by Congress”). 
 340. See Monaghan, supra note 339, at 3–5. 
 341. See id. at 20; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966). 
 342. See Monaghan, supra note 339, at 30–34 (“[A]ny distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional common law may be far too uncertain to be useful.”). 
 343. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 481–82. 
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warnings,344 the Court subsequently invalidated such a statutory 
alternative as insufficiently protective of Fifth Amendment rights.345 
The danger of constitutional common law, then, lies in the extraordinary 
consequences that flow from erroneously classifying a rule as either 
constitutional interpretation or constitutional common law. A common 
law rule treated as constitutional interpretation produces an unwarranted 
limitation on the political branches’ sovereign authority. Alternatively, 
treating a rule of constitutional interpretation as a common law rule 
improperly diminishes the status and protection of entrenched 
constitutional norms. 
Administrative common law fits uneasily into the broader legal 
regime that determines the legitimacy of federal common law. It is a 
field far too broad to qualify as an enclave.346 Courts rarely 
acknowledge the dominant common law character of administrative 
law,347 and a few Supreme Court opinions have been read to suggest 
some resistance to the phenomenon.348 Administrative law does not 
govern private conduct that would ordinarily be subject to state law,349 
but instead regulates the “constitutional function[s] or power[s]”350 of 
agencies that derive their authority from federal statutes.351 This would 
seem to counsel in favor of the legitimacy of administrative common 
law. On the other hand, the “constitutional function[s] and power[s],” 
that the Supreme Court has cited appear to be those grounded in the 
written Constitution.352 As previously seen, the core doctrines of 
administrative common law typically do not come from the written 
Constitution. And they often have little substantive connection with the 
federal statutes that authorize agency action.353 Some provisions of 
administrative statutes, such as the APA, are so broadly written that 
they “necessarily have been given concrete meaning and application by 
a process of case-by-case judicial decision in the common-law 
                                                                                                                     
 344. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“We encourage Congress and the States to continue 
their laudable search for increasing effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual 
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”). 
 345. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–43 (2000). 
 346. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1344. 
 347. See Beermann, supra note 227, at 2. 
 348. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 13, at 1305 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
administrative law decisions as forming a “pattern of judicial common law development 
punctuated by periodic resistance”). 
 349. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988). 
 350. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943). 
 351. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1979). 
 352. Compare Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366 (“When the United States disburses its 
funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power.”), with U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9 (authorizing Congress to appropriate funds as required by law). 
 353. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1311 (discussing the disconnect between 
administrative law doctrines and legislators). 
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tradition.”354 But administrative common law is a broad field composed 
of a wide variety of rules. In the aggregate, it is difficult to establish that 
uniformity considerations require each administrative common law rule 
or that the rules that state law would supply necessarily conflict with 
federal interests or policies.355 
Understanding administrative law as an unwritten constitution 
dispels much of this unease by unifying and revealing the federal 
constitutional import of the seemingly disparate rules that govern the 
administrative state. The theory explains that, even though 
administrative common law rules do not derive from the written 
Constitution, such rules have a constitutional character similar to that 
which the Supreme Court has previously found sufficient to legitimize 
the creation of federal common law.356 Administrative agencies are 
entirely creatures of federal law. Their existence and authority are “in 
no way dependent on the laws of . . . any . . . state.”357 Agency authority 
derives instead from the statutes, judicial decisions, and executive 
directives that together protect and promote an identifiable, uniform set 
of federal constitutional values.  
The unwritten constitution theory thus clarifies that administrative 
law ought to be governed by uniform principles created by federal 
sovereign authorities, including federal courts. The laws that comprise 
the unwritten administrative constitution implicate a uniquely federal 
“interest in getting the Government’s work done,”358 and are properly 
understood as a “peculiarly federal concern, warranting the 
displacement of state law.”359 Uniform federal rules are required in the 
administrative context because applying state law “would subject the 
rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty.”360 
                                                                                                                     
 354. Nw. Airlines v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981); see Metzger, supra 
note 13, at 1350 (stating that the “APA’s text is silent on several key issues”); Duffy, supra note 
227, at 130 (observing that the APA is written “broadly to provide courts with a measure of 
flexibility in interpreting the Act”). 
 355. See, e.g., O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994); Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 508 (1988). 
 356. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726 (“Since the agencies derive their 
authority . . . from specific Acts of Congress passed in the exercise of a ‘constitutional function 
or power,’ their rights, as well, should derive from a federal source.” (citation omitted)); 
Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366–67 (stating that the duties and rights of the federal government 
come from federal sources). 
 357. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366. 
 358. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505; see Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295–97 (1988) (noting 
that official immunity for federal officials “insulate[s] the decisionmaking process from the 
harassment of prospective litigation”); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 564, 572–73 (1959) (explaining 
that the privilege defense available to federal officials is an “expression of a policy designed to 
aid in the effective function of government”). 
 359. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505; see Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95. 
 360. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367; see Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (“Undoubtedly, 
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Perhaps more importantly, drawing on state law for the content of 
administrative common law would present a significant obstacle to the 
development and maintenance of essential, federal constitutional 
principles.361 In such circumstances, and “[i]n [the] absence of an 
applicable Act of Congress[,] it is for the federal courts to fashion the 
governing rule of law according to their own standards.”362 
This account also helps explain why federal common law in the 
administrative context poses little threat to—and may even more 
robustly protect—federalism principles. Part of the explanation is that 
administrative law is primarily concerned with regulating the federal 
government’s structure and operation. “No subject could be one of more 
peculiarly federal concern . . . .”363 It is both inappropriate for state 
regulation and likely to be of little interest to state governments.364 To 
be sure, the substantive aspects of federal regulation may have 
significant effects on state governments, state interests, and federalism 
values. But administrative law rules—particularly those that have a 
constitutional character—rarely have such effects.365 This is because 
administrative law rules regulate the administrative state itself; they do 
not directly affect substantive regulatory decisions.366 Administrative 
common law rules sometimes even protect federalism values.367 The 
unwritten constitution theory explains this phenomenon and provides a 
foundation for encouraging further development of rules that extend 
considerations of federalism into the administrative context. 
By placing administrative common law in a broader institutional 
context, the unwritten constitution theory shows that the Judiciary’s 
administrative lawmaking role furthers separation of powers 
principles368 by revealing unique, extrinsic limits on the Judiciary’s 
lawmaking authority. The legitimacy of federal common law rules is 
typically evaluated in relative institutional isolation, with the inquiry 
                                                                                                                     
federal programs that ‘by their nature are and must be uniform in character throughout the 
Nation’ necessitate formulation of controlling federal rules.” (quoting United States v. Yazell, 
382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966))); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959) (holding that the 
actions of a federal officer should be subject to federal law). 
 361. Cf. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (“Apart from considerations of uniformity, we 
must also determine whether application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of the 
federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solicitous of those federal interests.”). 
 362. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367. 
 363. Howard, 360 U.S. at 597. 
 364. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1345 (“[T]he Court has repeatedly said that it is 
inappropriate for state law to control federal administration.”). 
 365. See id. at 1297. 
 366. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 367. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1340, 1342. See generally Sharkey, supra note 252 
(examining how statutory language, judicial review doctrines, and executive policy regulate 
agency preemption of state law). 
 368. See Metzger, supra note 13, at 1346–47. 
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primarily focused on determining the scope of the Judiciary’s 
independent authority to create a particular rule.369 The role of the 
political branches in this analysis is quite limited, typically appearing 
only under the guise of statutory interpretation. Understood as one of 
several components of the unwritten constitution, however, 
administrative common law emerges as part of a larger, multi-branch, 
dialogic effort to situate administrative agencies within the federal 
government’s structure.370 In this account, the long-standing statutory 
provisions that authorize judicial review of agency action provide a 
more stable platform for administrative common law.371 Moreover, 
judicially created rules in this context both inform and are informed by 
the political branches’ complementary legal instruments, including core 
administrative statutes and executive policy directives. These 
nonjudicial components of the unwritten constitution legally and 
institutionally tether administrative common law to extrinsic policies 
and principles. This in turn limits judicial lawmaking authority and 
provides a basis for evaluating the substantive validity of administrative 
common law rules.372  
Under the unwritten constitution theory, administrative common law 
also furthers the separation of powers by embracing a central and 
complementary role for the political branches in governing the 
administrative state. The theory explains how administrative common 
law rules can have a constitutional character without being mandated by 
the written Constitution.373 By defining this constitutional character 
based on the rules’ function (e.g., the constitutive function) instead of 
by the substantive constitutional principles embodied in the rules (e.g., 
rule of law), the theory addresses the indeterminacy that arises in 
distinguishing entrenched, written constitutional requirements from 
administrative common law.374 This improved clarity can help reduce 
the likelihood that administrative law rules will be erroneously 
                                                                                                                     
 369. See supra notes 329–33 and accompanying text. 
 370. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture: 
Deliberation-Respecting Judicial Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2009) (“The premise of 
[constitutional adjudication] is that most constitutional horticulture should proceed through 
deliberation among legislators, executive officials, and voters.”). 
 371. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641–42 (1981); Nw. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95–96 (1981); Metzger, supra note 13, at 
1347. 
 372. See O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 89 (1994) (citing Nw. Airlines, 451 
U.S. at 98) (holding that evaluation of administrative common law rules is more appropriately 
left to Congress); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98 (1991) (“[A ]court should 
endeavor to fill the interstices of federal remedial schemes within uniform federal rules only 
when the scheme in question evidences a distinct need for nationwide legal standards.”). 
 373. See Metzger, supra note 3, at 484. 
 374. See id. at 518. 
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classified as deriving from the written Constitution.375 It thus explains 
why administrative common law, despite its constitutional character, 
does not present the dangers ordinarily associated with constitutional 
common law.376 By clarifying that administrative common law rules are 
not formally entrenched, the unwritten constitution theory also provides 
a solid foundation for involving the political branches in shaping the 
core doctrines that determine the constitutional position of the 
administrative state. The theory does so by emphasizing that 
administrative common law rules are “subject to the paramount 
authority of Congress”377 and should be informed by judicial 
consideration of relevant executive policies and practices. 
Excluding the courts from the important task of creating and 
maintaining the administrative state’s unwritten constitution would raise 
significant separation of powers problems.378 As previously discussed, 
the administrative state represents a significant deviation from the 
institutional structure originally created by the U.S. Constitution.379 This 
structural transformation shifted the balance of power from Congress to 
the President and minimized the role of the independent Judiciary.380 
Administrative common law addresses these problems by giving the 
Judiciary a role in extending constitutional values to the administrative 
context and “mediating the needs of both political branches for control 
of agency decisionmaking.”381 The phenomenon thus counteracts the 
administrative state’s diminishment of judicial power, while addressing 
the imbalance of power between Congress and the Executive.382 
Relatedly, administrative common law may be justified because 
Congress and the President each have compelling reasons to seek 
control over administrative agencies and use administrative law for 
purely political purposes. In this context, there may be reason to doubt 
                                                                                                                     
 375. See id. at 518, 525. 
 376. See supra notes 339–45 and accompanying text. 
 377. Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 
(1931)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Metzger, supra note 13, at 1347 (“Congress 
retains power to overrule judicial administrative law determinations.”). 
 378. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 26, at 687 (explaining that an “accommodation between the 
judicial and administrative roles was necessary” to the evolution and acceptance of the 
administrative state because “[a]ny system that modifies or eliminates the judicial role raises the 
specter of excessive governmental control”). 
 379. See supra Section I.A. 
 380. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 37, at 165–66, 172 (explaining that Congress is 
now more willing to “delegate significant lawmaking power to agencies”). 
 381. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1753 (2007); see id. 1767–71 (discussing how Congress can utilize “administrative 
procedures to influence agency action” and “obtain more information than it would have 
otherwise” without resorting to direct oversight). 
 382. Cf. McCutchen, supra note 24, at 21 (“The Court is required to seek a second best 
solution because its duty is to the balance of power embodied in the constitutional text.”). 
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the political branches’ objectivity in creating and adhering to principled 
rules governing the constitutional position of administrative agencies.383 
For this reason, the courts’ involvement in crafting the unwritten 
administrative constitution is not just defensible—it is indispensable. 
B.  Clarifying Congressional Duties 
In the legislative context, acknowledging the constitutional character 
of administrative law first requires that legislators monitor for changes 
in circumstance that may necessitate legislative action to preserve the 
substantive values of the administrative constitution. Such awareness is 
necessary if legislative reform is to capitalize on “constitutional 
moments” precipitating major developments in statutory administrative 
law.384 More generally, recognizing the constitutional dimensions of 
administrative law can help illuminate the areas of law that most need 
legislative reform. In short, “constitutional realism helps us to focus on 
those areas where constitutionalist values are most frequently 
encountered, even if not always the matters of the highest stakes.”385 
The unwritten constitution theory not only embraces the “broad power” 
of Congress to “alter specific administrative mechanisms 
notwithstanding their constitutional aspect” but also reveals Congress’s 
obligation to use that power.386 
At the same time, the unwritten constitution theory reveals that 
legislators have a prudential obligation to promote the rule of law 
through the steady but thoughtful evolution of the administrative 
constitution. Legislative reform proposals are rarely new—they are 
usually just the most recent effort to modify the administrative 
constitution’s balance of values.387 Over the long term, ideally, 
Congress should make such fundamental changes incrementally so as to 
promote the thoughtful evolution of unwritten constitutional norms.  
Statutes establishing political control of agencies via legislative 
review provide a good example of how this process might work. 
Beginning in the early 1930s, Congress began inserting legislative veto 
                                                                                                                     
 383. See Tidmarsh & Murray, supra note 325, at 627–30 (theorizing that federal common 
law is legitimate where there is reason to doubt the objectivity of state law and state courts). 
 384. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 145, at 342. See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE 
THE PEOPLE 63, 288–89, 307 (1991) (calling for a “sober legal codification of the new 
constitutional solution”); 2 id. at 160, 170–71, 409 (1998) (discussing constitutional change). 
 385. Ginsburg, supra note 17, at 126. 
 386. Metzger, supra note 3, at 484. 
 387. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 145, at 342 (“The current state of administrative law is 
the product of unique moments in history that each produced a particular balance of five key 
dimensions in the relationship between the government and the governed: accountability, 
efficiency, transparency, participation, and collaboration.”); cf. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 
23, at 6 (“Important aspects of American administrative law are vague, ambiguous, and more or 
less permanently contestable.”). 
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clauses into legislation that delegated authority to the executive and 
administrative agencies.388 Although such clauses took various forms, a 
legislative veto generally reserved to Congress the power to nullify an 
exercise of statutorily delegated authority.389 In 1983, INS v. Chadha390 
held such congressional veto provisions unconstitutional under the 
Constitution’s presentment391 and bicameralism392 requirements.393 
Congress’s response to the demise of the legislative veto was to enact 
the CRA,394 which, as previously discussed, enables Congress to block 
regulatory action by passing a resolution of disapproval. This 
component of the unwritten administrative constitution has thus evolved 
incrementally (and with judicial input) over the course of several 
decades.  
The most recent proposal in the long history of congressional efforts 
to politically control agencies is the Regulations from the Executive in 
Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, popularly known as the REINS Act.395 
The REINS Act seeks to strengthen and expand the CRA by requiring 
Congress to issue a joint resolution of approval before a major rule 
could go into effect.396 In contrast, nonmajor rules would continue to go 
into effect absent Congress’s issuance of a joint resolution of 
disapproval.397 This would be a significant constitutional change 
because it would alter the current balance of power between Congress 
and agencies.398 Such a profound alteration of the relationship between 
Congress and agencies could be seen as just the most recent step in the 
evolution of the political controls over administration. The REINS Act 
may be too big a step to take at once, however, because it would likely 
have far-reaching effects on other components of the administrative 
state’s unwritten constitution. Indeed, this reality is evident in the text of 
the legislation, which predicts (however implausibly) that the law might 
restrain Congress from imprudently delegating its legislative 
                                                                                                                     
 388. See Breyer, supra note 313, at 786. 
 389. See id. at 785–86. 
 390. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 391. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. 
 392. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cl. 2. 
 393. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956–59. 
 394. See 142 CONG. REC. 8197 (1996) (statement of Sens. Nickles, Reid, and Stevens). See 
generally Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162 (2009) 
(examining the origin and purpose of the CRA). 
 395. H.R. 10, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 396. See id. sec. 3, § 802. 
 397. See id. sec. 3, §§ 803, 807. 
 398. See Breyer, supra note 313, at 793–96; cf. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of 
Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 
911–13 & nn.73–74 (2008) (discussing the literature assessing the normative and positive 
dimensions of political control of agency action).  
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authority.399 
The constitutional character of administrative law requires Congress 
to approach legislation like the REINS Act with “an acute awareness of 
the past”400 and a holistic understanding of the likely effect of the 
proposed reform on the administrative constitution. These two 
imperatives are interrelated. Remembering the history and rationale of 
choices previously made is necessary to fairly and comprehensively 
evaluate whether a new proposal will serve constitutional values and 
avoid past mistakes.  
C.  Revealing Administrative Constitutionalism 
A final, important consequence of viewing administrative law as an 
unwritten constitution is to reveal the importance of nonjudicial, 
subsidiary mechanisms for protecting and promoting fundamental 
constitutional values in the administrative context. Administrative law is 
often highly juricentric in the sense that it is governed by a “myth” that 
“to the extent that law holds administration accountable, it is [the] law 
in courts that counts.”401 The APA, as enforced through judicial review, 
is frequently treated as if it were the primary (if not exclusive) 
mechanism for ensuring that administrative agencies operate 
consistently with background constitutional commitments.402 As we 
have seen, a variety of other statutes, executive orders, and pressure 
exerted through congressional and executive oversight mechanisms 
constitute the bulk of available controls of administrative action.403 
Indeed, “[h]ow administration works . . . depend[s] primarily upon the 
understandings, statutory precedents, and legal innovations of the 
executive and legislative branches, not the judiciary.”404 Viewing 
administrative law as an unwritten constitution requires due 
consideration of these essential components of the administrative 
constitution. 
One particularly important component of the administrative 
constitution—agency conventions—is brought to the fore only by 
viewing administrative law as an unwritten constitutional order. 
Conventions, which may also be referred to as “customs and practices,” 
are “extrajudicial unwritten norms that are enforced by the threat of 
political sanctions, such as defeat in re-election, retaliation by other 
political institutions and actors, or the internalized sanctions of 
                                                                                                                     
 399. See H.R. 10, § 2. 
 400. BRESLIN, supra note 16, at 73. 
 401. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1258 (2006). 
 402. See MASHAW, supra note 22, at 6. 
 403. See supra Part II. 
 404. MASHAW, supra note 22, at 6. 
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conscience.”405 By definition, conventions are not law.406 They are 
invisible from a juricentric or legally formalist perspective on 
administration. Incorporating careful consideration of agency 
conventions can fill in important doctrinal and operational details that 
are missed by focusing exclusively on judicial rulings.407 Such 
conventions can also be a powerful force for furthering constitutional 
values during the day-to-day work of administration. Recognizing their 
existence and importance is a necessary precondition, however, for 
inculcating in administrative officials a professional ethic of 
administrative constitutionalism.408  
CONCLUSION 
This Article seeks to clarify what “constitutional” means in the 
administrative context. The United States was founded on a 
commitment to written constitutionalism. This deeply ingrained 
tradition supports the commonly accepted view that the powers of the 
federal government flow from the U.S. Constitution. But it is also 
widely accepted that most of the federal government’s work is 
accomplished through administrative agencies. These institutions are 
not contemplated by the Constitution. Rather, they are created by the 
Legislature and administered through the Executive. In response to this 
revolutionary change in the nation’s constitutional structure, Congress, 
the President, courts, and agencies have found ways to imbue 
administrative law with familiar constitutional principles, including the 
separation of powers, the rule of law, and protection for individual 
rights. Over the course of nearly a century of development, 
administrative law has thus evolved to accommodate the administrative 
state, filling the Constitution’s silence with an unwritten administrative 
constitution—a body of seemingly disparate rules that extends a 
uniform and recognizable set of substantive constitutional values into 
the modern administrative context. 
                                                                                                                     
 405. See Vermeule, supra note 143, at 1182. 
 406. Id. 
 407. See id. at 1218; see also Elizabeth Fisher, Food Safety Crises as Crises in 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 55, 66, 73, 76–77 (2010) (discussing 
examples of how administrative agencies are characterized by the Judiciary and how the 
characterization is utilized in judicial decision making); cf. John McMillan, Re-Thinking the 
Separation of Powers, 38 FED. L. REV. 423, 423–24 (2010) (urging a new framework for 
Australian government legal accountability capable of integrating oversight and integrity 
mechanisms that are independent but nonjudicial and thus do not fit comfortably in the 
traditional three-branch conception of separation of powers). 
 408. See Vermeule, supra note 143, at 1189–91. A different manifestation of 
“administrative constitutionalism” involves “actions by federal administrative agencies to 
interpret and implement the [written] U.S. Constitution.” Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative 
Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (2013). 
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Recognizing administrative law as an unwritten component of the 
nation’s constitutional order may have various implications beyond 
those explored in this Article. In addition to supporting the legitimacy 
of administrative common law, it may counsel courts to be more 
transparent regarding the foundation and common law character of key 
administrative doctrines.409 The theory may similarly provide a 
foundation for greater administrative constitutionalism by encouraging 
agencies to incorporate constitutional considerations into administrative 
decision making.410 It may also aid in assessing the normative 
implications of discerning legal requirements based on governmental 
custom and practice, including the customs and practices of the 
President and agencies.411 In these ways—and perhaps in many 
others—the unwritten constitution theory clarifies the constitutional 
character of administrative law and provides a better foundation for 
continuing efforts to ensure that the administrative state operates 
consistently with the nation’s fundamental normative commitment to 
constitutionalism.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 409. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 13, at 1370 (encouraging courts to be open about their 
administrative common law decision making efforts). 
 410. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 3, at 497 (arguing in favor of an approach that “centers 
on encouraging agencies to take constitutional values and concerns into account in their 
decisionmaking”). 
 411. See Mashaw, supra note 8, at 662–63 (exploring the difficulty of explaining the 
normative claim, reach, or practice of federal government). 
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